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ABSTRACT 
The signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily guarantee long-lasting 
peace. In this thesis, we explore which factors explain variations in the success of peace 
processes after the signing of peace agreements. Recent research has found that of the 
216 peace agreements recorded between 1975 and 2011, only 125 resulted in the 
termination of violence for at least five years after signing the agreement. To shed light 
on those elements of the accords that are most relevant for the achievement of 
long-lasting peace, this thesis investigates differences in the degree of military 
implementation and political and judicial provisions as well as the involvement of the 
international community and economic funding. The thesis develops a comparative 
analysis of the accord implementation in El Salvador in 1992, Angola in 1994, and 
Colombia since 2016. These cases represent instances of successful, failed, and ongoing 
peace accord implementations, respectively. The analyses reveal that peace processes are 
more likely to succeed if: (1) sufficient economic funds are allocated for the 
implementation process, (2) an international third party is involved in the process, and 
(3) demobilization and disarmament programs are properly implemented, which will 
reduce violence drastically. In this case, political and judicial provisions play a 
role by complementing the process, assuring the commitment and trust between 
the parties allowing the process to move forward. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
“We have reached an agreement that, when it is observed, is infinitely better than 
continuing the war that broke families, hit regions and made us suffer a horror that our 
children will know, fortunately, only in history books.”1 These were the words of the 
president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderon, when he announced that a peace 
agreement between the Colombian government and the Colombian Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) was finally signed. 
Four years of negotiations in La Havana, Cuba, concluded with the signature of the accords 
in September 2016. Even the top representative of the FARC, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, 
also known as “Timochenko,” stated that “our only weapon will be the word,”2 reaffirming 
his commitment to peace. The agreement was similarly celebrated by the international 
community, with the Colombian president even receiving a Nobel peace prize in 2016 “for 
his resolute efforts to bring the country’s more than 50-year-long civil war to an end.”3  
Yet, has Colombia achieved peace? While a very important part of the peace 
process—and certainly cause for significant celebration—the signing of a peace deal does 
not, in and of itself, guarantee long-lasting peace. A recent study found that of the 216 
peace agreements recorded between 1975 and 2011, only 125 resulted in ending the 
violence for a minimum period of five years after signing the agreement.4 This statistic 
represents a failure rate of more than 40 percent, with 91 peace deals breaking down and 
                                                 
1 “‘Hoy Podemos Decir Que Se Acabó La Guerra’: Los Detalles Del Histórico Acuerdo De Paz Entre 
El Gobierno De Colombia Y La Guerrilla De Las FARC [“Today We Can Say That the War Is Over”: The 
Details of the Historic Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC Guerrillas],” 
BBC News Mundo, August 24, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37179271. 
2 Casa Editorial El Tiempo, “‘Miembros de las Farc, bienvenidos a la democracia’ [“FARC Members 
Welcome to Democracy”],” El Tiempo, September 26, 2016, https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-
de-paz/firma-del-acuerdo-final-de-paz-con-las-farc-en-cartagena-34636. 
3 “The Nobel Peace Prize 2016,” Nobel Prize, accessed August 13, 2019, https://www.nobelprize.org/
prizes/peace/2016/santos/facts/. 
4 Stina Högbladh, Peace Agreements 1975−2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset 
(Uppsala University (Sweden): Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report, 2012), 51. 
2 
conflict restarting less than five years after the signing of a peace accord. The Lusaka peace 
process that tried to end several years of violence in Angola is a good example of this 
finding. With about 54 percent of its provisions implemented, the Lusaka peace process 
still failed within three years after the signing.5 These numbers suggest that, rather than 
signaling the end of a conflict, the signing of the agreements is the starting point of a very 
difficult stage. Indeed, Jasmine Westendorf states that, “peace agreements are best seen as 
just one early step in the much broader and more complex process of ending violent 
hostilities and consolidating peace.”6 This thesis examines the following question: Which 
factors explain variation in the success of peace processes after the signing of a peace 
agreement? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The question that this research seeks to answer has global implications. About 70 
different conflicts and crises, including civil wars, are currently active around the world.7 
According to James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, between 1945 and 1999, approximately 
3.33 million battle deaths resulted from 25 interstate wars, with the median duration of 
these conflicts being close to three months. In contrast, during the same period, there were 
about 127 civil wars, with an average duration of six years, and the number of resulting 
fatal casualties was calculated at 16.2 million. Furthermore, civil wars, which have 
involved more than a third of countries in the United Nations (UN) system, have also 
triggered extensive displacement of people and refugee crises.8 In this context, this thesis 
can benefit policymakers, members of institutions like the UN, and non-governmental 
organizations that play any role in the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Colombia and 
                                                 
5 University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Lusaka Protocol, Peace 
Accords Matrix,” accessed September 24, 2019, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lusaka-protocol. 
6 Jasmine Westendorf, “Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity After Civil War,” Choice 
Reviews Online 53, no. 08 (April 1, 2016): 8–9, https://doi.org/10.5860/CHOICE.194645. 
7 “CrisisWatch,” Crisis Group, accessed August 30, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch. 
8 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American 
Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75. 
3 
other countries affected by conflicts, as this thesis provides new insights into post-civil-
war peace processes.  
For Colombia, in particular, peace is a fundamental right. As stated in the country’s 
political Constitution, Article 22: “Peace is a right and a duty of mandatory 
accomplishment.”9 But this is a right that has been violated during more than a half century 
of conflict. Unfortunately, this conflict was not limited to military actors. It caused civilian 
deaths, massive displacement, human rights violations, the breakup of families and 
communities, serious environmental damage, and numerous other atrocities. It also 
weakened the state’s capacity to provide medical and educational services, and 
significantly affected the national economy. The findings of this thesis will help shed light 
on the extent to which factors necessary for long-lasting peace are being implemented in 
the 2016 peace deal with the FARC. In doing so, the thesis also makes the prospect of 
achieving the fundamental right of peace once and for all a more tangible one.10  
This research will also benefit the U.S. government, which has provided security 
assistance and security cooperation to Colombia for decades, with the view of improving 
Colombia’s security and democracy. A peaceful demobilization of drug-supported illegal 
groups can significantly reduce drug trafficking into the United States, which will, in turn, 
strengthen the long-term relationship between the two countries, justifying the U.S. 
security-democracy “investment” in Colombia over time. 
                                                 
9 Corte Constitucional, Constitución Política De Colombia [Political Constitution of Colombia] 
(Bogota, 2016), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/inicio/
Constitucion%20politica%20de%20Colombia.pdf. 
10 Another important feature of this research question is that it will allow the Colombian government 
to use the findings as lessons that improve the proper implementation of possible future peace processes. In 
a more local environment, one can mention the peace process between the Colombian government and the 
ELN, which is currently in the initial stages. After the 2016 FARC deal, the ELN remains as the most 
important threat to Colombia’s public order. Founded along with the FARC in the early 1960s, the ELN 
came out of a combination of groups involved in La violencia, mostly students and recent college 
graduates. The ELN favored a Cuban-style revolution in Colombia, using violence to achieve political 
objectives. The evolution of this group over time has been marked by its participation in drug trafficking, 
kidnapping, assassinations, and other violent activities, especially in the northeast part of the country. The 
prospects for peace in Colombia are promising with the inclusion of the ELN in a new peace process. If the 
peace process with the ELN gets signed, this thesis will provide an opportunity to improve the time, 
resources, and efforts allotted in the post-signature stage of the process. Learning from previous 
experiences will prevent ELN extending its violence in the long term, just like FARC did. 
4 
Finally, this investigation seeks to complement the existing post-conflict related 
literature. While recent studies show that peaceful settlements to civil conflicts are 
becoming more common,11 the high failure rate highlights the fragility of the process and 
its highly uncertain outcome. According to Achim Wennmann’s estimates, “research on 
conflict recurrence suggests that about one third of the 58 negotiated settlements that ended 
armed conflicts between 1990 and 2005 relapsed back into armed conflict within the first 
five years.”12 In this same vein, Audrey Cronin writes that “the vast majority of 
negotiations that do occur yield neither a clear resolution nor a cessation of the conflict.”13 
Thus, the signing of agreements is far from a guarantee of the end of a conflict. 
Understanding the conditions that facilitate or hinder long-lasting peace is therefore 
essential for reducing the likelihood of conflict after peace agreements are reached. 
Westendorf confirms that “if foundations for lasting peace are not laid in the immediate 
post-settlement years, it is unlikely that the underlying structures of the conflict have been 
addressed and the probability of sustained peace may therefore be quite low even if the 
cracks have not already started to show.”14 By focusing on the aftermath of the peace 
accords—a period of great importance but one that has nonetheless received significantly 
less scholarly attention than the dynamics leading to the signing of the peace accords—this 
research aims to fill this gap.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to conduct the research that identifies the factors explaining the variation 
in the success of a peace process, one needs to define what success means. In this case this 
thesis agrees with Westendorf, who suggests “that the success of negotiated peace 
processes be understood and analyzed in terms of the extent to which they establish stable 
                                                 
11 Lotta Harbom, Stina Högbladh, and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements,” 
Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 5 (September 2006): 621–24, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0022343306067613. 
12 Achim Wennmann, “Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding,” 
Négociations 11, no. 1 (2009): 43, https://doi.org/10.3917/neg.011.0043. 
13 Audrey Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 36. 
14 Westendorf, “Why Peace Processes Fail,” 47. 
5 
social, political, and security conditions in which political conflicts are no longer settled 
by means of violence.”15 In simple words, peace is the lack of violence in a stable society.  
This section engages with the literature on civil wars and peacebuilding to identify 
relevant factors for explaining the variation in the achievement of long-lasting peace after 
the implementation of a peace agreement. Scholarship that has sought to identify the factors 
that enable long-lasting peace after a significant civil conflict can be organized around four 
dominant approaches. First, the type of conflict affects its duration and finally its outcome. 
Second, the content of the agreement defines its success. Third, the timing when the 
negotiations occur sets the stage for peace. And fourth, the implementation of a set of 
provisions will guarantee long-lasting peace. 
The first of these approaches posits that the type of civil war directly affects the 
duration of the conflict and the likelihood that long-lasting peace will be achieved.16 
According to this approach, some types of conflicts, by their very nature, tend to last longer 
and are more difficult to end than others. According to Fearon and Laitin, whereas civil 
wars emerging from coup revolutions tend to be short, those wars fought for land involving 
ethnic groups or peripheral insurgencies, and those financed by drug trafficking or mining 
resources, tend to last significantly longer. This is because more is at stake.17 An 
application of this approach to the peace deal implementation phase suggests that some 
peace processes, by their very nature, are more prone to failure than others as a result of 
                                                 
15 Westendorf, 41. 
16 David E. Cunningham, “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars,” 
Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 115–27; Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala, 
“Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 
(August 2009): 544–69, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336457; David E. Cunningham, Kristian 
Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and 
Outcome,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009): 570–97; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and 
Måns Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 253–
73, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043769; Håvard Hegre, “The Duration and Termination of Civil 
War,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 243–52; Karl R. de Rouen and David Sobek, “The 
Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 303–20, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043771; Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. 
Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 (2008): 
345–63; David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” American Journal of Political 
Science 50, no. 4 (2006): 875–92; and James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer 
than Others?,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 275–301. 
17 Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?,” 297–98. 
6 
the civil conflict that they are seeking to resolve. Yet, this logic offers few insights into 
how to actually achieve peace, much less sustain it.  
Another body of literature focuses on the content of the peace agreement.18 
Looking at interstate conflict, Virginia Fortna argues that particular ceasefire agreement 
mechanisms such as the demilitarization of zones, separation of troops, involvement of 
third parties, and confidence-building measures, among others, are essential for 
guaranteeing long-lasting peace.19 Peace agreements lacking these mechanisms are more 
prone to failure. Fortna’s work suggests that the fate of a peace process might be sealed at 
the moment of signature of a peace agreement, with some agreements being significantly 
more conducive to long-lasting peace than others as a result of their distinct content.  
Applying this model to the intra-state conflict arena, Michaela Mattes and Burcu 
Savun identify two types of provisions that should be included in the design of any peace 
agreement. These are cost-increasing and fear-reducing provisions.20 The first type relates 
to those provisions that, when enforced, will increase the costs of reengaging in war. These 
may include demilitarized zones and separation of troops. Fear-reducing provisions, on the 
other hand, deal with the idea the reducing the fear and uncertainty caused by the possible 
actions of the enemy. These provisions may include the involvement of third parties and 
power sharing agreements, and consequently can increase the prospect of peace.21 
A well-designed peace agreement will significantly decrease the likelihood of 
conflict resurgence. Including provisions that aim to reduce the uncertainty and fear caused 
                                                 
18 Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the 
Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars.,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 304–304, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433080450020810; Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, 
“Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,” American Journal of 
Political Science 47, no. 2 (2003): 318–32, https://doi.org/10.2307/3186141; Virginia Fortna, Peace Time: 
Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Roy 
Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993,” The American 
Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995): 681–90, https://doi.org/10.2307/2082982; and Barbara Walter, 
“The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 335–64, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/002081897550384. 
19 Fortna, Peace Time, 2. 
20 Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun, “Fostering Peace After Civil War: Committment Problems and 
Agreement Design.,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (2009): 738. 
21 Mattes and Savun, 738. 
7 
by the possible actions of the opponents and that increase the costs of war will significantly 
alter actors’ calculations. Yet, a well-designed peace accord is only one of the first steps of 
a long and fragile peace process. By focusing on the content of the accords and assuming 
that the process of implementation largely responds to this content, this approach overlooks 
important dynamics of the implementation stage.  
A third scholarly approach focuses on the timing of the peace accords rather than 
their content. Whether peace deals are signed and long-lasting peace achieved is seen as a 
function of the time at which the belligerents find themselves participating in the peace 
negotiations.22 A central element of this approach is William Zartman’s “ripeness theory,” 
which posits that “parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so.23 
Zartman notes that, “At that ripe moment, they are more likely to grab on to proposals that 
usually have been in the air for a long time and that appear attractive only now.”24 The 
moment in which parties decide to negotiate is the result of a locked state, also called a 
stalemate, in which the parties realize that there is nothing else to do. A military victory 
seems far from possible and the pain caused by constant losses is unnecessary. According 
to the theory, when the time is ripe and there is no other option but to negotiate, long-
lasting peace becomes more likely.25 Nevertheless, this approach cannot account for why 
some parties that choose to agree to peace eventually choose to return to war. More 
significantly, this approach does not offer a broad spectrum for analysis across other stages 
of the process. The idea of focusing on the right moment to start negotiations is limited. It 
is important to know when and why peace starts, but it is more important to know when 
                                                 
22 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends; Navin A. Bapat, “Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes,” 
Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 6 (2005): 699–717; I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict 
and Intervention in Africa, Updated ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Derek Leebaert, I. 
William Zartman, and Maureen R. Berman, “The Practical Negotiator,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 2, no. 2 (1983): 310, https://doi.org/10.2307/3323311; and T. David Mason, Joseph P. 
Weingarten, and Patrick J. Fett, “Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars,” Political 
Research Quarterly 52, no. 2 (1999): 239–68, https://doi.org/10.2307/449218. 
23 William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” in 
Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, ed. John Darby and 
Roger Mac Ginty, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 22. 
24 Zartman, 22. 
25 Zartman, 22. 
8 
and why it ends. Or as former guerrilla commander Ana Guadalupe Martinez stated, “What 
obliged us to sit down at the table was the stalemate. But what obliges one to negotiate is 
something different.”26 
Despite presenting significant insights into the process of peaceful resolution of 
armed conflicts, these approaches nonetheless shed little light on why peace processes fail 
in some places and succeed in others, even after the signature of the peace agreements. 
Certainly, these approaches fall short in analyzing stages other than pre-negotiation and the 
signature stage.  
The process of peace accord implementation is a highly variable one. As Marco 
Mezzera, Michael Pavicic, and Leontine Specker note, “peace processes can be perfectly 
institutionalized on paper, but eventually it is the reality of things that determine their actual 
relevance and evolution.”27 
To understand why some peace processes succeed while others fail after the signing 
of peace accords, a useful starting point is to consider how the degree of implementation 
of various accord elements ultimately influenced the outcome of the peace process. Peace 
accords only rarely achieve full implementation, yet an incomplete implementation does 
not necessarily trigger the return of conflict. Moreover, not all provisions are equally 
central for achieving peaceful outcomes. Understanding how the experience and degree of 
implementation of particular accord provisions shapes the prospects of a long-lasting peace 
can shed significant light on the priorities, as well as the most dangerous pitfalls, of the 
process of accord implementation. 
A survey of the literature suggests several provision themes that seem distinctly 
influential in the process of peace accord implementation. These include military, political, 
and judicial provisions, as well as other provisions that specify the role of the international 
community and the economic resources available to support accord implementation. In 
                                                 
26 Cynthia Arnson, Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 17. 
27 Marco Mezzera, Michael Pavicic, and Leontine Specker, “Governance Components in Peace 
Agreements” (Clingendael Institute, 2009), 28, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05466. 
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what follows, I discuss these provisions and consider the ways in which their degree of 
implementation could shape peace outcomes.  
1. Military Provisions  
Military provisions are related to variables incorporated in the agreement to modify, 
control, or solve the behavior of the parties. The military factors applicable to this case can 
include ceasefires or disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs for 
former militia members and the military, if necessary. Sixty-seven percent28 of all peace 
accords include one or more provisions described in the military category, with the most 
common provision being a formal ceasefire.29 Ceasefires do not represent the end of an 
armed conflict, but they do represent an important step in the process for definitive peace. 
Normally oriented to strengthen peace, build confidence, and resolve disputes, these 
military factors should be adopted by the belligerents to show their commitment to the 
agreement and to reduce the uncertainty about the opponent’s intentions.30 
The proper execution of a DDR program after the signature of a peace agreement 
is fundamental for a long-lasting peace. This particular provision reduces uncertainty 
significantly and contributes to ending the conflict definitively, preventing future human 
rights violations by the rearming of the parties. Focusing on the disarmament element, 
Jonathan Tonge highlights this point in his analysis of the Northern Ireland context, arguing 
that “decommissioning would provide conclusive evidence that the IRA has ‘gone away,’ 
and the war is over.”31 Similarly, Joanna Spear emphasizes that “any peace settlement that 
allows for the retention of arms by groups is open to charges of leaving in place the means 
                                                 
28 Högbladh, Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset; Fortna, 
Peace Time; Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland, Hot Spots in Global Politics (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, 
MA: Polity, 2006); Richard Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process: An Insider’s View,” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 9, no. 2 (January 1995): 5–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09557579508400113; and Joanna Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” in Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. 
Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 141–82. 
29 Högbladh, Peace Agreements 1975−2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, 44. 
30 Fortna, Peace Time, 3. 
31 Tonge, Northern Ireland, 191. 
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for future conflict.”32 The literature also suggests that, to be effective, the disarmament 
component of DDR provisions should include both conventional and unconventional 
weapons and war tools.33 
The two other elements of the DDR provision focus on demobilization—the goal 
of which is to bring the combatants out of the state of mobilization and abandon the 
insurgent group—and reintegration of the combatants into the civil society. The latter 
involves long-term social and economic programs in which the former guerrilla members 
acquire a legal status or become citizens. The new status guarantees their access to social 
programs, education, and health care. The first two parts of the DDR demand the 
commitment of the illegal group, while the reintegration demands the commitment of the 
government through the proper institutional changes to support these programs.34  
To increase the likelihood of long-lasting peace, the implementation of the DDR 
provisions must necessarily be implemented diligently and promptly after the signing of 
the accords. As Mozambique’s case shows, keeping the military actors in the assembly 
areas for extended periods of time threatens the peace process. In this case, the uncertainty 
caused by the lack of information about the near future caused outbreaks of misconduct 
within the population waiting to be demobilized. While this demobilization process was 
ultimately successful, it nonetheless highlights how, in a tense and uncertain environment, 
every little encounter between the actors can spark serious confrontations and threaten the 
peace process.35 Moreover, it shows the importance of a fast disarmament and 
demobilization phase to ensure a peaceful implementation of the agreement.  
                                                 
32 Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” 144. 
33 This includes war tools such as land mines or improvised explosive devices (IED) planted by 
guerrilla groups. As Spear describes: “The longevity of land mines makes them a menace to people and 
livestock and affects the ability of the society to utilize roads, arable land, and sources of water.” 144 
34 Gladys Chavarría, “Estrategias Utilizadas Para La Satisfacción De La Garantía De No Repetición 
En Desmovilizados De Grupos Armados Ilegales: Un Estudio Con Desmovilizados De Grupos 
Paramilitares De Las Autodefensas Unidas De Colombia. Medellín, Valle De Aburrá - Colombia, 
[Strategies used to satisfy the guarantee of no repetition in demobilized from ilegal armed groups: A study 
with demobilized from United Self Defense of Colombia]” Revista Facultad De Derecho Y Ciencias 
Políticas 42, no. 116 (2012): 226, http://www.redalyc.org/resumen.oa?id=151424089009. 
35 Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process,” 5–9. 
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2. Political Provisions 
Political provisions focus on the regulation of conflicts with a governmental 
incompatibility and involve provisions for dealing with this incompatibility.36 To clarify 
this idea, Högbladh states that, “conflicts with political incompatibilities are conflicts 
fought over the regime type, the composition of the government or with an aim to replace 
the government.”37 The particular political factors will vary based on the specific needs of 
each peace process, but some examples of these provisions include: changes in the 
constitution and the promise of referendum for independence or secession in Papua New 
Guinea,38 democratic elections in Mozambique,39 or the inclusion of the guerrilla group 
in the democratic process as a political party in the case of El Salvador.40 Regardless of 
the specifics of the provision, however, guarantees along this dimension will significantly 
increase the chances for long-lasting peace.  
The implementation of political provisions demands a major commitment from the 
government. Its role goes beyond that of allowing the political participation of insurgents 
and involves security guarantees for these sectors as they come out of hiding and begin to 
organize politically through legal mechanisms. Compliance with these provisions opens 
the space for democratization, participation, and contestation not only for the parties 
involved in the conflict, but also the population in general. Peace processes in which 
political provisions are implemented successfully reduce the likelihood of conflict 
resurgence by shifting the political conflict from extra-institutional to institutional 
channels, as well as by bringing legitimacy to the peace process. As such, their effective 
implementation significantly improves the prospects of a peaceful future.  
                                                 
36 Högbladh, Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, 45. 
37 Högbladh, 43. 
38 Anthony Regan, “Bougainville, Papua New Guinea: Lessons from a Successful Peace Process,” The 
RUSI Journal 163, no. 6 (November 2, 2018): 48, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1562020. 
39 Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process,” 10. 
40 Charles Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s Transition from Civil War to Peace,” in Ending Civil Wars: 
The Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth 
M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 383. 
12 
3. Judicial Factors 
Judicial provisions focus on the measures necessary to solve the issues concerning 
human rights violations and other crimes committed during the conflict41 and involve 
certain guarantees that need to be established to make the agreement appealing to those 
who have operated outside the legal system during the conflict, both on the insurgent and 
counterinsurgency sides. Justice provisions include guarantees such as national 
reconciliation, the release of prisoners, amnesty, the return of the displaced population, and 
the proportional punishment of those who systematically and disproportionally committed 
human rights violations. They also often involve the creation of special justice committees 
that deal with the transition to legality of the newly reincorporated personnel.42  
Judicial provisions are not designed to bring impunity to the agreement. On the 
contrary, the goal is to avoid the repetition of the violations and the reengagement in 
violence by creating a legal framework that reduces uncertainty and increases the buy-in 
of the various actors involved and affected by the process.43 The effective implementation 
of these judicial provisions after the signing of the peace accord seems crucial both for 
guaranteeing the support of the actors involved in the conflict and the general citizenry 
affected by it.  
                                                 
41 Högbladh, Peace Agreements 1975–2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, 48. 
42 Jose Rios and Daniel Garcia, Building Tomorrow’s Peace: A Strategy for Reconciliation, cited in 
Mark Chernick, “Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a 
Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia,” Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. 
Cynthia Arnson (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Press; Stanford University Press, 1999); Angélika 
Rettberg, ed., Entre El Perdón Y El Paredón: Preguntas Y Dilemas De La Justicia Transicional, 1st ed. 
(Bogotá D.C., Colombia : Ottawa: Universidad de Los Andes, Programa de Investigación sobre 
Construcción de Paz, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales : Ediciones 
Uniandes, Centro de Estudios Socioculturales e Internacionales ; Centro Internacional de Investigaciones 
para el Desarrollo, 2005); Chavarría, “Estrategias Utilizadas Para La Satisfacción De La Garantía De No 
Repetición En Desmovilizados De Grupos Armados Ilegales”; and Högbladh, Peace Agreements 1975–
2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. 
43 Chavarría, “Estrategias Utilizadas Para La Satisfacción De La Garantía De No Repetición En 
Desmovilizados De Grupos Armados Ilegales, [Strategies used to satisfy the guarantee of no repetition in 
demobilized from ilegal armed groups: A study with demobilized from United Self Defense of Colombia]” 
216. 
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4. The Involvement of the International Community 
Another body of literature has identified that the will for negotiation and the 
commitment to comply with what was agreed has to exist between the parties in conflict in 
order for the peace process to succeed. But peace processes are built in an environment of 
uncertainty, mistrust, and fear, where restarting the confrontation is more likely to happen. 
This is why the involvement of the international community, which will perform different 
roles during the process of peace implementation, is indispensable.44  
The participation of the international community is defined by Marieke Kleiboer as 
follows: “a form of conflict management in which a third party assists two or more 
contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force.”45 The international 
community supports the peace process as outsider and neutral actors committed to peace 
implementation. The assistance provided by the international community is broad and 
multi-faceted. At a more abstract level, its participation as a neutral outsider force 
committed to peace implementation reduces uncertainty and, as a result, costs of 
compliance for the various actors involved. At a more practical level, the international 
community provides essential economic and procedural resources that, in a strong peace 
process, will span basically all the stages of peace implementation. For instance, the 
international community is oftentimes in charge of monitoring the implementation of the 
military provisions and verifying that the disarmament of the parties is accomplished on 
time according to what was established in the agreements. The international community 
also verifies the application of judicial provisions such as amnesties or the release of 
prisoners and supports political provisions such as the establishment of political parties. 
Thus, as Cynthia Arnson states, “The role of the international community, through such 
                                                 
44 Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure in International Mediation,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 40, 2 (June 1996): 360–89; Arnson, Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of 
Violence; Mezzera, Pavicic, and Specker, “Governance Components in Peace Agreements”; James Shinn 
and James Dobbins, Afghan Peace Talks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1131rc; Mattes and Savun, “Fostering Peace after Civil War: 
Committment Problems and Agreement Design”; and William Stanley and David Holiday, “Broad 
Participation, Diffuse Responsability: Peace Implementation in Guatemala,” in Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. 
Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 
45 Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure in International Mediation,” 360. 
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institutions as the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and also 
through the actions of individual governments, has been essential to the conclusion of 
peace agreements.”46 Without the international community’s involvement, uncertainty, 
fear, and distrust will tend to make the challenges of peace implementation insurmountable.  
5. Economic Funding 
Economic funding refers to those aspects within the peace agreement that describe 
how the various phases of implementation will be funded. Although much of the literature 
tends to ignore this as a central component of the implementation process, evidence of its 
significance can be found scattered throughout.47 Establishing long-lasting peace is an 
expensive process. Failure to allocate the funds needed to support the implementation of 
the agreement can bring the process to critical moments and even cause the return of 
hostilities.48  
The importance of the economic factors can be easily established if one keeps in 
mind that every step of the implementation of the agreements requires significant monetary 
support, from the establishment of democratic institutions and processes to collection of 
testimonies for national reconciliation efforts.49 The lack of funds for the effective 
implementation of these programs will significantly compromise the implementation of the 
peace accords. The peace process in Guatemala provides a useful example for highlighting 
the significance of economic provisions. As part of this peace process, the international 
community provided significant economic support to remediate some of the issues 
established in the accords. Yet, poor consensus within the government and the private 
                                                 
46 Arnson, Negotiating Peace and Multiple Forms of Violence, 9. 
47 Wennmann, “Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding”; James K. 
Boyce and Madalene O’Donnell, eds., Peace and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar 
Statebuilding, Center on International Cooperation Studies in Multilateralism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc, 2007); Dinorah Azpuru, “Peace and Democratization in Guatemala: Two Parallel 
Processes,” in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Stanford, CA: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 1999); and Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful 
Peace Process.” 
48 Wennmann, “Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding,” 44. 
49 Boyce and O’Donnell, Peace and the Public Purse, 6. 
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sector about tax reforms caused other programs to be poorly implemented or not 
implemented at all due to the lack of resources generated through taxes.50  
Poor implementation of the peace accords, especially in the social realm, might 
have played an important role in sparking the social violence in Guatemala after the 
agreements. This violence normally involved former combatants who did not receive the 
aid that was promised in the agreements. The Guatemala example thus illustrates that while 
international sponsors help cushion the process of implementation, mechanisms must 
nonetheless be established to generate the necessary resources to fund the peace 
implementation process through its completion.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates the extent to which particular provisions have significantly 
influenced the outcomes of peace processes after the signing of peace accords. While peace 
accords are often drafted to reflect comprehensive and multi-dimensional solutions to 
complex social conflicts, their actual implementation often falls remarkably short from the 
targeted goals both in breadth and depth. The literature reviewed in the previous section 
offers a number of hypotheses regarding the particular types of provisions that, if left 
unimplemented or are only implemented partially, represent the greatest risk to peace. Not 
all peace accord components are of equal relevance. This thesis seeks to increase our 
understanding of the types of provisions that are essential for long-lasting peace.  
Hypothesis 1: The prompt and successful implementation of military provisions, 
especially DDR, will drastically reduce the levels of violence in the short term. The proper 
implementation of the disarmament program will reduce the violence generated by the 
conflict to minimum levels. Conflicts that fail to implement the agreed upon DDR 
programs will be significantly more likely to experience a return to conflict than those that 
successfully complete these programs.  
Hypothesis 2: The successful implementation of political provisions established in 
the accords will significantly increase the likelihood of lasting peace. The proper 
                                                 
50 Azpuru, “Peace and Democratization in Guatemala,” 121. 
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implementation of political provisions will increase the sense of inclusion among ex-
combatants. Allowing the former guerrilla groups to create their own political parties and 
their participation in elections will strengthen the democratic process and reduce the 
incentives for returning to conflict. Failure to implement these provisions will increase the 
likelihood that collective grievances will be channeled through renewed social conflict.  
Hypothesis 3: A mismanaged implementation of justice provisions, either the poor 
or partial practice of justice, or variations in the agreements will cause the peace process 
to fail. The poor or partial implementation of the justice provisions will create the sense of 
impunity especially among the victims of the conflict. Variations on what was agreed 
seeking harder or softer punishment for one of the parties will reduce the legitimacy of the 
government and the process itself. This will make the peace process more prone to failure. 
Hypothesis 4: The involvement of the international community in funding and 
verifying the implementation of the military, political, and justice provisions will reduce 
the chances of the conflict restarting. The role of the international community in funding 
the implementation of the agreements is a key aspect for long lasting peace. The ability to 
fully implement everything that was agreed will show the combatants the benefits of 
demobilizing and reintegration over going back to illegal activities and violence. The 
involvement of the international actors in verifying the implementation of the DDR 
programs, the fair and safe inclusion in politics of former combatants, and the 
implementation of fair transitional justice and its mechanisms will cause the parties to 
develop an environment of trust and certainty, open to moderate and flexible dialogue in 
case that the complexity of the process demands it to overcome any contingency. A stable 
environment will increase the chances of success of a peace process. 
Hypothesis 5: The lack of funding for the implementation of the agreements will 
seriously reduce the chances for the peace process to succeed. If there is no money to 
accomplish what was agreed, peace will not last. If the implementation of the DDR 
programs do not meet the expectations for the combatants, they will not see the benefits of 
handing over their weapons. Political participation will be restricted and unfair, and the 
institutional changes necessary to bring justice after the conflict will not occur. Violence is 
more likely to resume. 
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Hypothesis 6: The proper and prompt implementation of military (DDR) 
provisions, the involvement of the international community in the process, and sufficient 
funds to sustain the implementation efforts will lay the basis for a successful peace process. 
The implementation of political, and judicial provisions will support the implementation 
effort. Long-lasting peace will result only when all of these provisions are implemented 
successfully after the signing of peace accords. Failure to implement any one of these 
provisions will significantly reduce the prospects of long-lasting peace.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this thesis involves in-depth comparative case studies of 
peace processes in El Salvador, Angola, and Colombia. These three case studies were 
chosen to be compared due to certain similarities and differences. Among the similarities 
are the inclusion of similar provisions in their peace agreements; the type of intrastate 
conflict that these agreements try to solve; and the fact that all of them moved on to the 
implementation phase. On the other side, the difference in the outcomes of the peace 
processes in El Salvador and Angola, as well as from previous peace processes in 
Colombia, is also important. The comparison of these three cases provides enough data to 
establish what factors were present in the successful peace processes and which were not 
in the failed ones. After this comparison it is possible to assess the situation of the 2016 
peace process in Colombia based on these results. 
This thesis draws primarily from previous studies of peace processes, the 
University of Notre Dame’s Peace Accords Matrix, and various statistical sources on 
conflict resolution trends. Case studies of peace processes describe different scenarios, 
regions, conflicts, leaders, and other key factors that were indispensable for the outcome 
of peace processes. This research analyzes a variety of publications—books, reports, 
newspapers, and journal articles—to understand the nature of these conflicts, the content 
of their peace accords, and their experiences with peace implementation. The Peace 
Accords Matrix, for its part, offers an index of degree of peace implementation that enables 
me to conduct a very detailed comparison between the chosen cases, analyzing year by 
year, each one of the provisions included in each peace agreement.  
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The most representative goal of a peace process is to reduce or to completely 
extinguish the violence between the parties in conflict. Decreasing the number of deaths 
caused directly by the actors in conflict provides a sound way to measure whether peace 
was achieved and whether the implementation of these military factors is enough not only 
to change the affected population’s perception of security in the short and long term. Based 
on the literature, a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths serves as a base for low intensity 
conflicts and over 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year for full-scale wars.51 Comparing 
this number with the numbers from pre-implementation should provide a reasonable idea 
about the immediate influence of the implementation of DDR programs. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is organized in five chapters as follows: the first chapter introduces the 
research question and identifies theoretical explanations for the variation in outcomes of 
peace accord implementation processes. Chapter II develops a case study of how the 
successful implementation of military (DDR), political, and judicial provisions, how the 
involvement of the international community, and how sufficient economic funding played 
a key role in achieving long lasting peace after the signing of the Chapultepec peace 
agreement in El Salvador. Chapter III turns to describe how the poor implementation of 
the same set of provisions caused the contrary effect resulting in the resumption of the 
conflict after the signing of the Lusaka accord in Angola. Using the insights of Chapters II 
and III as a starting point, Chapter IV then analyzes the 2016 peace agreement between the 
Colombian government and the FARC to determine its prospects for success. Finally, in 
Chapter V, I summarize the central findings of this thesis, discuss the recommendations 
for conflict resolution-related Policies, the policy recommendations for Colombia, and the 
shortcomings drawn from the research process. 
                                                 
51 Therese Pettersson, “UCDP Dyadic Dataset Codebook v 19.1” (Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research Uppsala University), 2019, 4, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. 
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II. CHAPULTEPEC ACCORDS: IMPLEMENTING PEACE 
IN EL SALVADOR 
This chapter examines the implementation process of the peace agreement in El 
Salvador. The purpose of this examination is to evaluate the degree to which different 
accord provisions were implemented effectively and assess how this implementation 
experience shaped patterns of long-lasting peace. The Chapultepec peace accords of El 
Salvador are widely considered an instance of successful peace accord implementation. 
According to the Peace Accords Matrix, 96 percent of the provisions in the peace process 
in El Salvador were implemented successfully.52 Thus, evaluating where they were 
implemented fully, where implementation fell short, and what impacts resulted from these 
levels of implementation should shed light on the most essential elements of an effective 
accord implementation process.  
This chapter presents the conflict’s background to clarify the roots and main causes 
of the conflict in El Salvador. Second, this chapter describes the content of the peace 
accords that comprise the Chapultepec peace agreement. The aim is to highlight the 
provisions that the parties agreed to implement in order to address the main causes of the 
conflict. Third, the chapter provides a more detailed description of the implementation of 
the military (DDR), political, and judicial provisions, the involvement of the international 
community in the process, and the economic funding available for the implementation 
process. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing how the degree of implementation of 
the previous provisions influenced the successful outcome of the peace process in El 
Salvador. 
52 “Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix,” University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute 
for International Peace Studies, 2015, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement. 
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A. CONFLICT BACKGROUND  
The civil war in El Salvador endured for approximately 12 years, from 1980 until 
1992. The conflict caused the death of an estimated 70,000 Salvadorans, displaced more 
than 250,000 civilians, and caused over $2 billion in property damage.53 
The roots of the conflict can be traced to both structural and political factors. 
Structurally, Salvadoran society has been characterized by high levels of inequality and 
lack of opportunities, especially in the countryside. With an economy based on agriculture, 
the concentration of land ownership became a major problem. A study published by the 
Central American University (UCA) in 1983 showed that “10 percent of all coffee 
producers controlled 80 percent of all Salvadoran production.”54 Another study by 
Tommie Sue Montgomery found that “114 family groups, comprising 1,309 individuals, 
dominated coffee production, processing, and export.”55 Both studies present proof that 
ownership of land in El Salvador progressively moved from the hands of many to the hands 
of few. This caused an uneven distribution of wealth, opening the gap of social inequality 
and injustice. 
Politically, Salvadoran society was also characterized by a lack of access to political 
space for those representing centrist or leftist parties, and significant polarization along 
ideological and class lines.56 Family and marriage ties between the rich land owners and 
the political elites created a net of favoritism and bureaucratic positioning.57 This net was 
strengthened by the linkage of retired military officers, who still had access to the security 
sector, playing an important role in containing possible opposition to the elites. The 
                                                 
53 Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 
2012), 13, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012081. 
54 Cecilia De Saade and Evelyn Rivas, La Concentración En La Producción De Café Y Las 
Modificaciones Inducidas Por El, De Agraria: Periodo 1970–1982, [The Concentration in the Production 
of Coffee and the Modifications Induced by It, Agrarian; 1970–1982 Period,] (San Salvador: Central 
American University, 1983). 
55 Tommie Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution, 1st Ed. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1992). 
56 Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s Transition from Civil War to Peace,” 384–85. 
57 Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador, 18. 
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integration of these three groups, land owners, political elites, and the military was known 
as the oligarchy.58 The oligarchy also owned the media. They controlled what was 
published, denying the opportunity for political expression to other possible contenders.59 
In sum, the oligarchy exercised control over the main source of the economy, the 
government, the media, and the military, using the latter to repress any kind of opposition. 
These dynamics of control limited the possibilities of implementing change through 
political institutions. Although periodic elections were carried out between 1948 and 1978, 
in 1979, military officers carried out a coup and implemented a revolutionary junta.  
This authoritarian turn, characterized by violence, the lack of political opportunity, 
and an uneven and unjust society, triggered the consolidation of the Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional or 
FMLN), an insurgent movement that brought together five smaller insurgency groups that 
had formed in years prior.60 The intensity of the conflict escalated from there, in large part 
as a result of an increase in FMLN membership and the tactics employed by the insurgents, 
which allowed them to take control of certain territories and obtain support from popular 
organizations.61  
External actors also played an important role in the conflict; the conflict served as 
a proxy war during the Cold War, with the United States aligning itself with the Salvadoran 
government and the Soviet Union providing indirect assistance to the FMLN through Cuba 
and Nicaragua—likely intensifying and prolonging the conflict further.62 After significant 
bloodshed and a political stalemate, the Salvadoran civil war ended with the signature and 
successful implementation of the Chapultepec peace agreements in 1992. 
                                                 
58 Negroponte, 18. 
59 Negroponte, 20. 
60 These included the Popular Liberation Forces (la Fuerza Popular de Liberación or FPL), the Popular 
Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario Popular or ERP), the Communist Party’s Armed Forces of 
Liberation (Partido Comunista de las Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion or FAL), the National Resistance 
(Resistencia Nacional or RN), and the Central American Workers’ Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos or PRTC). 
61 Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s Transition from Civil War to Peace,” 385–86. 
62 Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador, 1. 
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B. THE PEACE PROCESS 
On January 16, 1992, the government of El Salvador and the FMLN sat together to 
sign the Chapultepec Peace Agreement. The agreement is the compilation of three different 
accords, which aimed to address different issues. First, the accords aimed to put a definitive 
end to the Salvadoran armed conflict by reforming military institutions and demobilizing, 
disarming, and reintegrating former combatants into civilian society.63 Second, “the 
accords intended to reform the constitution, promote the democratization of the country, 
guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify Salvadoran society.”64 Third, 
they aimed to address social and economic problems and to establish the National 
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de 
la Paz or COPAZ). The mission of COPAZ was to facilitate necessary legislation, and to 
verify and oversee the implementation of the provisions in the Accords.65  
A further agreement included the reform of the judiciary in order to address issues 
related to human rights; the goal was to make the judiciary more independent by 
establishing the commission of the truth and a human rights prosecutor.66 In a broad 
spectrum, the accords focused on human rights as well as political and military provisions 
because according to Antonio Cañas and Hector Dada, “it was electoral fraud, repressive 
security forces, and systematic violations of human rights that activated the latent social 
conflict in El Salvador and contributed to the outbreak and continuation of the war.”67 
The Chapultepec Peace Agreement in its eight chapters and various annexes 
describes the following:68 
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• Violence-related reforms: The accords declared the cessation of the armed 
conflict. They included a ceasefire, the dismantlement of the military 
structure of the FMLN, separation of forces, and the UN’s verification of 
all the factors previously mentioned.  
• Military forces reform: This effort included changes in the military 
education system, the investigation and further dismissal of military 
officers who were found by the ad hoc commission to have committed 
human rights violations, and a reduction in military personnel, equipment, 
and budget. The reforms also included the establishment of a newly 
structured national police that would remain under the control of civilian 
leadership replacing the already existing police. 
• Judicial system reforms: This component sought to guarantee the 
judiciary’s independence from other powers and established a national 
counsel whose mission was to defend human rights. 
• Electoral system reforms: This effort involved the creation of a special 
committee responsible for carrying out and verifying fair and free 
elections. 
• Social and economic reforms: These reforms pursued sustained and more 
egalitarian economic development, guaranteed through agrarian loans and 
other measures. They sought, in the long term, to enable the reunification 
of Salvadoran society.  
• Political reforms: This component created opportunities for the political 
integration of the FMLN, their organization as an official political party, 
and their participation in elections. To guarantee this process, it 
incorporated full guarantees and special security measures to protect any 
FMLN political leaders and granted them access to mass media. It also 
included measures to restore governance in conflict zones. 
24 
Finally, the Chapultepec agreement also incorporates provisions that directly 
describe the role of the UN in verifying the agreement, as well as a specific timetable for 
the implementation of each provision. 
The peace accord implementation process was not easy, and the presence of active 
spoilers made any moderation between the parties even more difficult.69 Balancing these 
extremist actors were three major domestic mediators: the Catholic Church (the Salvadoran 
archbishop), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the Jesuit community 
leadership.70 International actors such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and 
the UN mediated the peace effort,71 all of which were being supported by regional actors, 
particularly during the negotiations, motivated mainly to contain the conflict and keep it 
from reaching their borders.72 Within El Salvador, teachers, mayors, local NGOs, and 
community leaders played an important role of mediating in their small towns to allow for 
the conducting of daily activities.73 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS  
This section analyzes the implementation process for four of these provisions: 
military (DDR), political, judicial, and the involvement of the international community. 
These four provisions have been regarded as the most common provisions to be 
implemented in peace processes.74 In this research economic funding is also considered an 
essential factor for the successful implementation of peace accords. For each of the 
provisions, I evaluate the experience of implementing the provision, the degree of success 
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of this process, and the consequences of the successful or failed implementation of the 
provision.  
1. Military Provisions (DDR) 
This section evaluates the implementation of the DDR programs within the military 
provisions. Disarmament reduces uncertainty and the risk of the conflict restarting by 
taking away the main tool for war (arms) from combatants’ hands. Demobilization aims to 
bring down the military structure of the insurgent group. Reintegration involves long-term 
social and economic programs like loans, education, and health care. To increase the 
likelihood of long-lasting peace, DDR provisions must be implemented diligently and 
promptly after the signing of the accords. 
Chapter Seven of the Chapultepec accords established that the termination of the 
armed conflict should start on February 1, 1992 (D-day), and should be completed by 
October 31, 1992. The termination of the armed conflict comprised the cessation of armed 
activities, the demobilization, the dismantling of FMLN’s military organization, handing 
over the weapons, and the reintegration of its personnel into civil society. Demobilization 
was to be conducted in two phases, the first one, from D-day until D-day + 5 and the second 
one from D-day + 6 until D-day + 30. During this time the Salvadoran Armed Forces 
(FAES) was to retreat to its different military facilities while the FMLN was to occupy 
their designated areas of concentration.75 At the same time, ammunition, explosives, and 
improvised explosive devices (IED) and other war equipment was to be kept in storage 
awaiting its destruction. According to the agreement, weapons destruction was 
programmed to be held simultaneously in all concentration areas, between October 15 and 
31, 1992. The UN was tasked to verify the implementation as well as to investigate any 
possible violation of these programs.76 
The process of demobilization started as established in Chapter Seven of the 
Chapultepec accords. The FAES and the FMLN were supposed to retreat progressively to 
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their assigned places of concentration. But delays, especially by the FAES, meant the 
deadlines were not met. The intervention of the United Nations Observer Mission in El 
Salvador (ONUSAL) was necessary to restart the process. The FAES completed the 
concentration of the first group of troops on June 26, 1992. The FMLN also achieved the 
concentration of a percentage of its combatants according to what was agreed by June 26, 
1992.77 
Nevertheless, problems transferring land titles pushed the FMLN to stop the 
concentration of the remaining troops until progress was made on these land transfers. In 
reaction to this situation, the FAES did the same and stopped its demobilization; at this 
point the process of demobilization stalled.78 Again, ONUSAL intervened extending the 
deadline for both parties to complete the demobilization. Finally, ONUSAL announced 
that the process of demobilization was complete. On 1December 15, 1992, the conflict 
between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN was officially ended.79 According 
to the Peace Accords Matrix, the process of demobilization in El Salvador was qualified as 
implemented on an intermediate scale during 1992. After 1993, the demobilization 
program was regarded as fully implemented.80  
The process of disarmament started in 1992 with two parallel activities; the 
submission of the report about the inventory of weapons in possession of the FMLN, and 
the disarming of FAES’ civil defense units.81 The FMLN agreed to gather its armaments 
by the end of November and to start their further destruction on December 1, 1992. A series 
of delays were caused by the delivery of poorly maintained weapons by the FMLN.82 This 
                                                 
77 University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, “Chapultepec Peace 
Agreement, Peace Accords Matrix.” 
78 University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. 
79 University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. 
80 University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. 
81 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador,” United 
Nations Security Council, November 23, 1992, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/chapultepec-peace-
agreement. 
82 “Letter Dated 11 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, November 13, 1992, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/
accord/chapultepec-peace-agreement. 
27 
situation triggered the dissatisfaction of ONUSAL with the FMLN’s performance in the 
disarmament task. Finally, on November 30, 1992, the FMLN submitted the final set of 
weapons to ONUSAL. This time the number and the condition of weapons matched the 
expectations of ONUSAL, which finally authorized the destruction of the weapons.83  
On May 23, 1993, a large stash of armaments was found in neighboring Nicaragua. 
The FMLN confessed that they had not been honest about the total number of weapons 
they had and recognized the existence of more sites like this, both within and outside the 
borders of El Salvador. Despite their declaration of not having any intention to go back to 
hostilities, the peace process was seriously threatened. The FMLN ultimately committed 
to assist ONUSAL in locating and destroying a total of 114 arms caches. ONUSAL verified 
their total destruction on August 18, 1993. Later on, the FMLN announced that its military 
structure was fully disintegrated.84 The process of disarmament went slower due to the 
delays previously mentioned. During 1992 and 1993 the process was in a minimum stage 
of implementation. After 1994 the implementation advanced into an intermediate stage that 
lasted until 1998. Full implementation was achieved after 1999, when the process of 
disarming the civilian population began.85 The ceasefire between the FMLN and the 
government of El Salvador was never broken.86 
The process of reintegration of former combatants into society suffered a series of 
delays and difficulties. This was the slowest of the three programs. Credit deficiencies, lack 
of funds, and ineffective assistance programs affected mostly former FAES members. 
Also, a great number of family members of the victims of the conflict were denied the 
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benefits of certain programs because the claimants lacked proper legal documentation.87 
It was not until 1997 that the program moved from minimum to full implementation. Yet, 
even after the reintegration program was regarded as complete, many of the former 
combatants from either the FAES or the FMLN remained unemployed. In this regard, 
Margarita Studemeister confirms that “In El Salvador, the demobilization of armed 
government and guerrilla forces left many combatants from both sides unemployed and 
maladjusted, contributing to a rise in public insecurity.”88 This shows that, while conflict 
did not erupt again, the ineffective implementation of the reintegration programs 
nonetheless brought about a number of secondary social and economic effects that would 
allow for the growth of non-political social violence. 
As a whole, even after delays and other difficulties, DDR programs in El Salvador 
were fully implemented. The retreat of legal troops in compliance with the agreements and 
the full demobilization, disarmament, and further reintegration of former belligerents were 
fundamental for the achievement of peace in el Salvador. The demobilization and 
concentration of the FMLN troops, the lack of access to weapons, and the possibility to 
receive land and other economic benefits allowed former combatants to see the benefits of 
re-entering society rather than returning to armed conflict. Even if the implementation of 
the DDR provisions moved slowly from minimum through intermediate stages to full 
implementation, it was, nonetheless, successful. The international community played a 
significant role in mediating and helping to overcome the difficulties during the 
implementation of DDR programs. 
2. Political Provisions 
Political provisions are included in peace processes to address governmental 
incompatibilities between armed groups whose goal is to achieve power of the state by 
challenging the actual government. Chapter Six of the Chapultepec agreement 
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contemplates the creation of any legislative measure to guarantee the participation of 
FMLN in politics. This includes their legal transformation into a political party, guaranteed 
access to mass media, and special security measures, if required, by any of its members to 
avoid political violence.89  
On May 23,1992 the FMLN declared itself a political party right after the Mexico 
City agreement was signed in April of the same year. The Mexico City agreement stated 
in its content that the FMLN and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democratico 
Revolucionario or FDR) had the right to be recognized as political parties.90 Yet the 
implementation of these measures should not have been put in place until their 
reaffirmation by the Chapultepec agreements in 1992. Within months of signing the 
Chapultepec agreement, the FMLN opened the space for political plurality. In this matter, 
Diana Negroponte informs that, “Ruben Zamora founded the Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (Frente Democratico Revolucionario or FDR) for the moderates within the 
movement, and Schafik Handal retained the leadership of the Salvadorian Communist 
Party (Partido Comunista Salvadoreña).”91 Presidential elections were planned for March 
1994, and observers from ONUSAL were requested for that event.92 Despite a low number 
of registered voters and several other difficulties, mainly logistical, the elections took place 
March 20, 1994, without any major inconvenience or alteration of the public order. 
ONUSAL’s commission considered the elections acceptable. A run-off election was held 
because none of the presidential candidates received a majority of votes.93 Many of the 
problems shown during the first round were addressed, allowing the second round to be 
held with no major issues. Armando Calderon Sol, from the Alianza Republicana 
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Nacionalista (ARENA) party, was elected president after registering 68 percent of the 
votes.94  
Political reforms, FMLN’s transformation into a political party, and its access to 
media helped to achieve deep changes in the political process, allowing political pluralism 
and free and fair elections. By 1994, political provisions in El Salvador were qualified as 
fully implemented.95 This level of implementation and the fact that political violence was 
almost nonexistent during this stage96 helped to appease the confrontational environment 
between the historical enemies, avoiding the resumption of the conflict by increasing their 
trust in one another and in the process itself. 
3. Judicial Provisions  
Chapter Three of the Chapultepec agreement stipulated reforms in the Salvadoran 
judicial system as well as the creation of new institutions. The main goal of these reforms 
was to detach the judicial system from other sectors of the government and political parties, 
in order to achieve independence and transparency.97 The new system required the 
approval of two thirds of the legislature to approve Supreme Court members, thus reducing 
the opportunities for impunity.98 The agreement also stated the creation of the new 
National Public Security Academy (Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica or ANSP), 
the Truth Commission, the judicial training school, as well as the national police and its 
new doctrine.99 By 1997, the reform to the national police was completed and fully 
implemented. The new National Civil Police (PNC) was considered to be more efficient 
than its predecessor.100  
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The Truth Commission was established and fully implemented by 1993. This 
commission made a great contribution in documenting grave violations of human rights, 
but despite its efforts some of its recommendations were never implemented. Right after 
its report became official, the government of President Alfredo Cristiani sanctioned a 
general amnesty benefiting both the FAES and the FMLN. This act generated a negative 
perception within the population towards the judiciary because the amnesty was seen as a 
straight hit against truth and reconciliation by promoting impunity.101  
As previously mentioned, the judiciary training school was created. Around six 
percent of the state’s budget was allocated to the judiciary to facilitate its efficiency, 
independence, and neutrality.102 But despite these positive aspects, the system remained 
inefficient.103 The Truth Commission, the judicial training school, and the civil national 
police were fully implemented. In contrast, the reforms to the existing judicial system 
remained at an intermediate level of implementation and were regarded as inefficient.104 
This partial implementation, however, did not affect the course of the peace process. In 
fact, the amnesty enjoyed by the parties made the processes even more appealing to them, 
reassuring their judicial status, and reducing uncertaintities about their legal future.  
4. The Involvement of the International Community 
The implementation of peace processes is typically conducted in an environment 
of uncertainty, mistrust, and fear, in which restarting the confrontation is more likely to 
happen. These factors demand the assistance and involvement of a third, external and 
neutral party during the whole peace process, including the implementation phase. Here, 
the involvement of the international community becomes indispensable in performing 
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different roles like monitoring, observing, and mediating between parties in moments of 
critical tension.105  
Resolution 693 of May 20, 1991, opened the doors to ONUSAL. Its mission as 
described in the Chapultepec agreements was to verify the accomplishment and proper 
implementation of the agreements signed in New York, Mexico City, San Jose, and 
Chapultepec. Also, ONUSAL was to be the institution in charge of coordinating any other 
international cooperation. 
ONUSAL had three main divisions: Military, Human Rights, and Police. Several 
direct interventions through mediation between the parties during moments of tension, and 
several extensions requested by the parties followed ONUSAL’s involvement in El 
Salvador.106 ONUSAL’s verification was extensive; it included several different fields of 
action. The ONUSAL Human Rights Division conducted a series of investigations that 
resulted in lengthy reports about human rights violations committed by both parties.107 
ONUSAL’s presence was also requested to monitor the elections in March 1994, as well 
as to provide professional assistance and guidance through its police division to the national 
civil police. ONUSAL’s Military Division was involved in observing compliance with 
DDR programs, and in mediating during the stalled moments of the demobilization and 
disarmament. Its intervention reinforced the trust of the parties as they pulled back and 
handed over their weapons.108  
ONUSAL’s observing mission was officially dissolved by the United Nations on 
April 30, 1995. Due to pending implementation of some provisions, ONUSAL 
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recommended the creation of the Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador 
(MINUSAL), which was comprised of police advisors and other professional staff 
members. MINUSAL was subsequently replaced by the United Nations Office of 
Verification (ONUV), a small group whose mission was to verify the last stages of 
implementation of the provisions.109 In 1996, the UN withdrew its mission from El 
Salvador, and in June 1998 the few remaining ONUV members completed their peace 
accord verification.110  
The United Nations played a very important role in El Salvador by observing, 
verifying, and contributing to institution building, and by mediating with great impartiality 
during a number of difficult moments or potential crises during the implementation of the 
peace accords. The UN’s presence in El Salvador brought a stable environment to the 
process that would have not been under other conditions. That stability is very important 
during the implementation of peace processes due to the confrontational nature of the 
parties involved. Without a third party to diminish the animosity the most likely result 
would be the resumption of conflict.111 The monitoring and verification mechanism 
provision was regarded as the quickest to be fully implemented.112 The prompt 
deployment of the UN mission established a strong basis for the implementation of the rest 
of the provisions. 
5. Economic Funding  
Economic funding is a core aspect of any peace process. Its importance lies in the 
fact that every provision, program, and institutional reform needs money to be properly 
implemented. Establishing long-lasting peace is an expensive process113 that requires the 
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allocation of domestic and foreign funds. The proper implementation of peace agreements 
(some provisions being more critical than others) will result in enduring peace. In the 
contrast, failure to allocate the funds needed to support the implementation of an agreement 
can bring the process to points of crisis and even cause the return of hostilities. 
Unfortunately, much of the literature tends to ignore the importance of funding as a central 
component of the implementation process.114  
The funding of the peace process in El Salvador was considerable. Since the peace 
accords were signed, El Salvador received an average of $400 million per year in foreign 
aid from different sources.115 The United States has been the largest bilateral donor, and 
Germany, Japan, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands following this list. The multilateral 
organizations included the World Food Programme, World Health Organization, World 
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration.116 These resources provided military and social stabilization during the 
implementation of the agreements. Despite donors’ efforts, some issues slowed down the 
process of implementation of certain programs. One of these issues was the allocation of 
funds itself. An estimate of needed funds totaled $1.8 billion. The government of El 
Salvador committed $408 million of its own resources to meet this need. The U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) pledged reported a total of $739 million, which meant that $682 
million were still needed.117 Another problem involved the discrepancies between the 
priorities established by the government and those established by other donors. According 
to James Boyce while the government and the United States dedicated more than 75 percent 
of their money to “higher priority programs” such as the PNC, land transfer programs, 
democratic and judicial institutions, poverty alleviation programs, and the reintegration of 
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former combatants; other donors devoted 78 percent of their funding to “lower priority 
programs.”118  
The lack of funds in certain programs had a direct impact on the implementation of 
the agreement. For example the purchase of land was affected by the shortage of funds, 
especially early during the implementation. Failure to provide land or credit for tools and 
seed was used by the leadership of the FMLN as an excuse to slow down the demobilization 
of about 30,000 people.119 To address the land problem, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and European donors provided extra funds. Even though the money 
was marked for land programs, it was used for different programs. The result was that by 
June 1994, only 25 percent of those eligible for credit had taken possession of land. This 
number was not close to the goal of 47,500 beneficiaries.120 Despite budget shortages and 
mismanagement, by 1995 approximately $1.8 billion had been spent in support of the peace 
accords in El Salvador. An additional $1.3 billion were promised by the international 
community to support the full implementation of the programs.121 By November 1996, 
almost 99 percent of probable recipients had received land titles, and 87 percent of those 
had completed the necessary documentation in the national registry.122  
Even when in certain moments the funds to implement the peace accords seemed 
short, the government of El Salvador made a great effort to provide what was available in 
an attempt to comply with the agreements. Also the participation of the international donors 
with large amounts of money reinforced the commitment to peace. In Boyce’s words 
“External assistance has done much to fund the costs of peace in El Salvador. In general, 
implementation of the programs mandated by the Peace Accords has not been seriously 
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hampered by a lack of external resources.”123 In general terms, the implementation of the 
different programs established in the peace accords was successful; the allocation of funds 
granted the full implementation of all the provisions included in the Chapultepec accords.  
Even though social violence and insecurity in El Salvador increased after the peace 
process, they were not caused by direct confrontation between the government and the 
FMLN. Social and economic issues can be attributed as the possible main causes, although 
further investigation and analysis are necessary to address this situation. Table 1 shows the 
level of implementation of the five provisions, and the total implementation of the 
agreement as a whole in El Salvador. 
Table 1. Percentage of peace accord programs implementation in El 
Salvador 
Provisions Level of Implementation 
Military (DDR) Full 
Political  Full 
Judicial Intermediate 
Involvement of International Community Full 
Economic Funding Full 
% of implementation 96% after 10 years 
 
D. CONCLUSION  
The El Salvador peace process presents an interesting case study in which one can 
observe how the provisions analyzed serve a specific purpose influencing the development 
of the peace process. The involvement of the international community, economic funding, 
and demobilization and disarming proved to be fundamental for the success of the peace 
process, while political and judicial provisions played a different role by reinforcing the 
achievements of the previous three provisions. 
In El Salvador, the international community played two main roles. First, the 
prompt implementation of UN’s missions and the assistance provided by monitoring, 
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verifying, and mediating increased the trust between the FMLN and the government, 
reducing the uncertainty in almost every stage of the implementation. Second, the 
international community, through its economic funding, guaranteed the implementation of 
the programs established in the accords. Deficiencies in funding, on the other hand, resulted 
in poor implementation of the reintegration programs. Though these programs aimed to 
address socio-economic issues for former combatants seeking to be part of the Salvadoran 
society, their limited success did not affect the outcome of the peace process itself.  
Implementation of the demobilization and disarming programs is fundamental for 
a successful peace process. Demobilizing the troops results in them abandoning their areas 
of dominance. It also helps to dissolve their military structure, reducing its strength and 
capacity to resume fighting. Disarming completes the process of demobilization, removing 
the weapons from the combatants’ hands and, in so doing, eliminating the risk of an 
accidental or intentional armed confrontation. After handing over its weapons, the FMLN 
was obligated to seek the UN’s assistance instead of resuming the conflict when the process 
stalled.  
In the case of El Salvador, political provisions seem to have played a more 
supportive, rather than central, role in guaranteeing the end of the conflict. The 
participation of the FMLN in politics brought opportunity for representation for those who 
did not have that opportunity before and strengthened the trust between parties and the 
peace process itself.  
Judicial provisions similarly played a secondary role in El Salvador. Their partial 
implementation and the deficiencies shown during and after the peace process did not affect 
the process in a critical way. The implementation of a total amnesty for the members of the 
FAES and FMLN reduced the uncertainty about their legal future, increasing their will to 
comply with the agreements. 
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III. LUSAKA ACCORDS: IMPLEMENTING WAR IN ANGOLA 
This chapter evaluates the implementation phase of the Lusaka Accords in Angola. 
The goal of this analysis is to evaluate the effects and consequences that the degree of 
implementation of certain provisions had on the outcome of the peace process. The 
resumption of conflict four years after the signature of the Lusaka accords makes this an 
informative case study. According to the Peace Accords Matrix, only 54 percent of the 
provisions were implemented, ultimately resulting in the failure of the peace process in 
Angola.124 Assessing which provisions were implemented effectively, which remained 
unimplemented, and what challenges were encountered throughout the implementation 
phase should shed light on the central threats to successful peace processes. The analyses 
should provide a clear view of which provisions require a more detailed and prompter effort 
of implementation to guarantee long-lasting peace after the signature of a peace agreement. 
The chapter first presents background about the conflict. This section describes why 
the conflict in Angola started, its social consequences, and the attempts made to end it. 
Second, the chapter describes the content of the Lusaka peace accords, their principal 
reforms, and the provisions established to solve the main incompatibilities that sparked the 
conflict. Third, the chapter presents a detailed analysis of the military (DDR), political, and 
judicial provisions, the involvement of the international community, and the economic 
funding allocated to the process. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing how the degree 
of implementation of these provisions influenced the failure of the peace process in Angola. 
A. CONFLICT BACKGROUND 
The Angolan armed conflict was long and complex. The conflict dates back to the 
country’s struggle for independence, during which multiple nationalist groups waged war 
against the Portuguese forces.125 By the time Portuguese rule collapsed in January 1975, 
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three main liberation movements remained: National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA), whose leader Jonas Savimbi used to be part of the National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA). After independence from Portugal, and despite their common goal of an 
independent nation, these three liberation movements engaged in an internal conflict for 
control of the new country’s government.126 
Two main factors worked against these three rebel movements finding an 
agreement that avoided the internal conflict in Angola. First was their ethnic roots; the 
MPLA was mostly composed of Mbundu people. The FNLA consisted of Bakongo people 
who resided in northern Angola. UNITA was formed mostly by Ovimbundu citizens from 
the highlands of central Angola. 
Second was the incompatibility of their ideologies. While UNITA and the FNLA 
were rural based and anti-communist groups, the MPLA was more urban-oriented and 
espoused a Marxist doctrine.127 To make this mixture even more volatile, not only local 
groups participated in the conflict. The conflict in Angola also involved various external 
actors. Zaire supported the FNLA, and South Africa supported UNITA. The United States 
supported both UNITA and FNLA. The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA. This 
support became the factor that tilted the scale in favor of the MPLA. The two other 
insurgent groups—UNITA and FNLA—eventually joined forces against the MPLA. 
Finally, in 1975, the MPLA succeeded in taking over the government by military means. 
UNITA remained as MPLA’s main opposition militarily and political opposition, 
prolonging the conflict for almost three decades.128 
The 27 years during which the conflict in Angola took place can be divided into 
three main periods: (1) from the independence of Angola from Portugal in 1975 to the 
signing of the Bicesse accords in 1991, (2) from the presidential elections in 1992 to the 
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signing of the Lusaka accords in 1994, and (3) from the failure of the Lusaka accords in 
1998 to the assassination of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, which represented the military victory 
of the government over UNITA.129 Two recent peace processes sought to resolve the 
conflict by peaceful means: the 1991 Bicesse accords and the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. 
Both of these peace accords failed and resulted in the return to conflict.130 In early 1999, 
soon after the collapse of the Lusaka accords, a large humanitarian crisis was sparked: over 
a quarter million Angolans were displaced from their residences, and this number increased 
to one million in almost six months. In the central region of Angola, two cities, Kuito and 
Malanje, alone reported 270,000 displaced people. Violence also affected the agriculture 
in the region, reducing the production of food. International aid also was interrupted; 
organizations like CARE and the World Food Programme could not send their convoys to 
help the displaced Angolans.131 
By the end of the conflict in 2002, more than a half million people had perished and 
over double that number had been displaced within Angola’s territory. The conflict also 
brought serious consequences to Angola’s economy, infrastructure, religious institutions, 
and public administration.132 
B. THE PEACE ACCORDS 
The Lusaka Protocol was signed in Lusaka, Zambiais on November 20, 1994, 
between Faustino Muteka, representing the government of Angola, and Eugénio Ngolo, on 
behalf of UNITA.133 The UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Angola, 
Alioune Blondin Beye, was the third signatoree of the protocol. The Lusaka peace process 
was carried out under the auspices of the UN and those governments designated to observe 
it, which included the Russian Federation, Portugal, and the United States. Though its 
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signature was mistakenly regarded as the “conclusion” to Angola’s violent “Third War,” 
134 the protocol brought temporary hopes to millions who had been affected by the conflict. 
The Lusaka Protocol through its Annexes aimed to achieve four different goals. 
First, it intended to improve and to implement the provisions described in the Bicesse peace 
accords signed in Lisbon in 1991. Originally these accords sought to accomplish: first, the 
achievement of a ceasefire between both parties. Second, they aimed to ensure that 
UNITA’s members recognize the actual government of Angola until new elections could 
be held. Third, the accords paved the way for the legal participation of UNITA in politics. 
Fourth, they established a common agreement on constitutional changes between the 
parties. Fifth, they ensured free and fair presidential elections. Sixth, the accords also 
ensured respect for human rights. Seventh, restructuring of the National Army was set 
down in the protocol. And, eighth, it provided for the announcement to general public about 
the beginning of the ceasefire.135  
The second goal of the Lusaka Protocol was to establish and improve the electoral 
institutions created after the 1992 presidential elections. UNITA would accept elections 
and, in return, the government would guarantee UNITA’s participation in politics. Third, 
the protocol sought the achievement of enduring peace based on the reconciliation of the 
actors and the victims of the conflict. It intended to accomplish this by demobilizing and 
disarming UNITA’s troops and with these troops abandoning the territory under their 
control. Furthermore, the protocol sought the establishment of the United Nations Security 
Council’s mandates, allowing the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) 
to oversee the implementation of the accords. A different pact negotiated between the 
parties would allow the government of Angola and UNITA to divide Angola’s income.136 
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The Lusaka Protocol in its ten annexes (chapters) established that the groups in 
conflict were committed to: 137  
• Implementation of the agenda: The parties agreed to follow a specific 
agenda for the peace talks, which included the main provisions.  
• Commitment to the Protocol: Both parties officially re-affirmed their 
acceptance of the main legal instruments and content of the protocol as the 
basis for the peace in Angola. 
• Military issues: It included the reestablishment of the ceasefire, the retreat, 
concentration, and demilitarization of all UNITA troops and disarming of 
all the civilian population, among others.  
• The national police: Its reorganization and the inclusion of UNITA’s 
personnel as its members. National reconciliation that included, among 
others, the participation of UNITA in the different levels of the 
governmental administration as well as in the diplomatic missions abroad.  
• Completion of the electoral process: It focused mostly on a second round 
of free and fair presidential elections, and the necessary measures to 
guarantee its development.  
• The United Nations mandate: This point established the role of the 
observers and the joint commission within the whole process; a timetable 
for the implementation of the protocol; and finally other matters. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS  
This section analyzes the implementation process for four provisions: military 
(DDR), political, judicial, and the involvement of the international community as well as 
the funds available to support their implementation. For each provision individually I 
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evaluate the degree of implementation and its influence in the final outcome of the peace 
process. 
1. Military Provisions (DDR) 
Annexes III and IV (Military Issues I and II) of the Lusaka Protocol included a 
military provision to restart the ceasefire on D-day+15, which coincided with the official 
signing of the Lusaka Protocol. The accord also included that the armed forces and UNITA 
should pull back from their areas of influence into concentration areas. There, both groups 
would initiate the process of reduction for the armed forces and demobilization, 
disarmament, and reintegration for UNITA. During this time, hostile propaganda against 
each other was forbidden. Also, the government would collect the weapons held by the 
Angolan civil population. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III 
(UNAVEMII) would verify the compliance with the agreements.138 
The demobilization program in Angola did not see a good start and certainly did 
not have a good end. A full year after signing the Lusaka Protocol, the UNITA troops 
started to demobilize. By 1995, little progress was made and only 363 UNITA members 
out of an approximate of 50 to 60 thousand had demobilized. Apparently, the majority of 
these were children with weapons in bad condition.139 In regard to this situation, the 
Secretary-General stated, “It is disturbing that, more than one year after the signing of the 
Lusaka Protocol (which ended the war in November 1994), the quartering of UNITA 
troopsone of the central elements in the peace processhas not made any significant 
progress.”140 After this point, no real demonstrations of will to comply with the 
agreements were made. UNITA’s few attempts to demobilize its troops were characterized 
by situations in which a large percentage of the personnel demobilized were not real 
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UNITA members.141 In some cases, these people could not even disassemble their own 
weapons. By the end of 1997, all 15 UNITA concentration areas and demobilization sites 
were closed. In a last effort to solve the situation, MONUA and the warring parties 
established a new final timetable for demobilization. This new timetable was supposed to 
be completed at the end of February 1998, but no further demobilization efforts were made. 
By this time, violence was common, especially in the countryside.  
In 1998, MONUA’s staff was removed from the territory.142 According to the 
Peace Accords Matrix, the demobilization program had only reached an intermediate level 
of implementation and, as such, ultimately failed to achieve its aim.143 This failure to 
demobilize UNITA’s troops had major consequences for the other components of the DDR 
programs (disarmament and reintegration).  
The implementation of the disarmament program in Angola showed similar 
characteristics as that of the demobilization one. There were significant delays in the 
process of handing over weapons; few weapons were turned over and, in many cases, the 
weapons that were handed over were those in very poor condition.144 In 1996, a UN report 
showed that 20,039 UNITA troops were concentrated in their designated areas and only 
16,837 weapons were turned over.145 The same year and after many delays, UNITA finally 
handed over a significant number of weapons (28,762 personal weapons and 3,969 heavy 
ones).146 The constant access to weaponry allowed UNITA to conduct different armed 
actions that were categorized as direct violations of the Lusaka Protocol, many of those 
during 1995 and 1996. These included the March 1995 shooting down of a UNAVEM III 
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helicopter in Quibaxe.147 By 1998, and according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
“the conflict in Angola was coded as a “war,” reaching over 1000 total deaths in that 
year.”148 According to Ian Spears, “Many believed that Savimbi retained a residual force 
of his best fighters and most lethal equipment as insurance against further government 
offensives or to launch one of his own.”149 
The reintegration of the former combatants depended on their previous 
demobilization and disarmament. The program in Angola was designed to assist the 
integration of demobilized soldiers into society and to provide counseling, vocational 
assistance, business orientation, loans and tools, as well as funds for short-term 
initiatives.150 The humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit delivered food, medical 
assistance, and other social programs for demobilized UNITA troops and over 100,000 of 
their relatives who were also concentrated in the assigned areas.151 By June 1997, 
according to a UN Security Council report, “over 23,000 demobilized soldiers and their 
dependents had been transported to their areas of origin or choice and provided with basic 
medical care and multi-purpose reintegration kits.”152 By 1998 the number of ex-
combatants increased but not significantly. It was reported that lack of funds was a main 
issue for all the reintegration projects.153 Well-armed, trained, and socially excluded 
combatants saw in violence a more profitable way of living than the one offered by peace. 
In Angola, the poor implementation of the DDR programs proved to have serious 
consequences in the outcome of the peace process. A large number of mobilized troops and 
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easy access to a large number of weapons empowered UNITA to conduct violent actions 
basically during the whole process of implementation. Also, an apparent lack of funds 
condemned an already disorganized reintegration program, leaving the combatants no 
more choices but to go back to conflict. 
2. Political Provisions  
Angola’s first elections as an independent nation were held in September 1992. A 
high number of voters were registered to attend the elections. These numbers were 
expected, as that was the Angolans’ first chance to express their political preferences.154 
In this opportunity, President Dos Santos, of the MPLA, won with 49.6 percent of the vote, 
defeating Savimbi, of UNITA, who received 40.7 percent.155 This result meant that an 
election runoff needed to be held. Despite the fact that UN and other foreign observers 
stated that this election process was free and fair,156 Savimbi rejected the results of the 
elections and decided to return to full-scale conflict. This conflict lasted until 1994 with 
the signature of the Lusaka Protocol.  
Annex 7 of the Lusaka Protocol established the procedures to complete the electoral 
process initiated during the implementation of the Bicesse accords. In order to conclude 
this process, a second round of presidential elections would be held. This would also open 
the door for the implementation of a democratic culture in Angola.157 
Annex 6 (National Reconciliation) in the Lusaka Protocol in Angola included the 
modification of the government in order to allow a power-sharing style. In this case UNITA 
members would occupy 17 positions in the executive and 70 seats in the parliament. 
Different sources suggested many of these positions for UNITA members were filled 
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between 1994 and 1996, including 11 in the executive branch and some parliamentary 
seats.158 
The Lusaka Protocol also included in its political provisions that UNITA could be 
legalized as a political party. Yet, no election or any preparatory effort took place between 
1994 and 1995.159 In 1996, Savimbi called for the Angolan president to legalize UNITA 
as a political party and to declare an amnesty. According to Savimbi, a positive response 
from the government to these two requests would have been the basis for improving other 
military provisions; no official response from the government was released in regard to 
UNITA’s request.160 In 1998, UNITA finally became a legal political party and was 
headed by Savimbi. Later that year, however, the National Assembly repealed Savimbi’s 
position in UNITA, suggesting he was unable to meet party obligations.161 The same year, 
MONUA reported that UNITA and the Angolan government were actively engaged in war 
against each other.162  
The implementation of political provisions in Angola was characterized by a series 
of delays. Four years after the signing of the protocol, almost no advances had been made 
in the implementation. This caused this provision to remain at its minimum level of 
implementation. The mediocre implementation of political provisions in Angola probably 
did not drive the return to conflict on its own. Poor demobilization and an abundance of 
weapons already had the parties on the verge of conflict. Furthermore, the lack of strong 
political provisions could not grow enough trust and commitment between the parties to 
prevent the restarting of the conflict. 
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3. Judicial Provisions 
The Lusaka Protocol did not specify judicial provisions per se. There were, 
however, provisions on police reform and national reconciliation that included unclear 
parameters for an amnesty. Annex 5 (Police Reform) in the Lusaka Protocol established 
three main reforms to be carried out. First, there was the insertion of over 6,000 UNITA 
troops into the already existent Angolan National Police (ANP) after the completion of the 
demobilization program. Second, there was the verification of the ANP activities during 
the implementation stage, and third, it included the demobilization of the Rapid Reaction 
Police Force (RRPF).163 According to UNAVEM III (the UN Angola Verification 
Mission), CIVIPOL contingency (Civilian Police observers), by 1996, no single UNITA 
troop had been integrated into the ANP; the progress was hampered by persistent fighting. 
By late 1996, a mere 5,458 RRPF officers in 13 camps had been quartered. In 1997 the 
police reform provisions were minimally implemented. No reports were made on the 
selection and integration processes into ANP by 1998. CIVIPOL continued with its 
mandate well into late 1998, reporting human rights abuses and the conditions of Angolan 
prisons until the conflict restarted.164  
The national reconciliation provisions included that UNITA’s leadership would 
receive private homes, governmental offices, ministries, and embassies, among others.165 
National reconciliation also included a section for amnesty that states in its Annex 6:  
In the spirit of National Reconciliation, all Angolans should forgive and 
forget the offenses resulting from the Angolan conflict and face the future 
with tolerance and confidence. Furthermore, the competent institutions will 
grant an amnesty in accordance with Article 88(h) of the Constitutional 
Law, for illegal acts committed by anyone prior to the signing of the Lusaka 
Protocol, in the context of the current conflict.166  
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It is difficult to assess the real reach of the amnesty provision, especially because 
the amnesty article is clear about pardoning crimes committed before the signing of the 
Lusaka accord. Violence continued not long after the signing and the government did not 
make big efforts to implement the amnesty between 1994 and 1998, even after several 
requests by UNITA, or after both parties used it as tool for putting pressure on their 
counterpart. Neither the reforms to the police nor the amnesty were ultimately put in place.  
4. The Involvement of the International Community  
Annex 8 of the Lusaka Protocol stated that the government and UNITA would 
commit themselves to protect and respect the UN mission, its personnel, property, and its 
mandates. The protocol also provided the UN with the task of verifying, supervising, 
overseeing, controlling, mediating, and monitoring the parties’ actions concerning the 
provisions in the accord.167  
The international effort to oversee the Lusaka Protocol was led by the UN. But it 
did not start with the signature of the Lusaka accords. The UN established its presence well 
before, with its UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), which was active from 
January 1989 until May 1991. The first verification mission received the task to verify the 
total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.168 After the task was completed, 
UNAVEM II was established, replacing UNAVEM I between June 1991 and February 
1995. Its mission was to verify the compliance with the peace agreements by the Angolan 
government and UNITA with the Bicesse accords, which included the elections in 1992.169  
The result of these elections sparked a new conflict between the Angolan 
government and UNITA; this conflict would be eased by the signing of the Lusaka accords. 
UNAVEM II kept its presence in Angola until 1995. According to the UN, “On 8 February 
1995, the Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAVEM III with a maximum 
strength of 7,000 troops and military support personnel, 350 military observers, 260 police 
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observers and some 420 internationally recruited civilian staff, 300 locally recruited staff 
and 75 United Nations Volunteers. The date envisaged by the Council for the completion 
of the UNAVEM III mandate was February 1997.”170 The UN mission in Angola was the 
largest peacekeeping operation in the world, but it was not until 1996 that UNAVEM III 
reached its full strength,171 though the Lusaka Protocol was signed in 1994. The delay in 
the deployment of UN troops had a very negative impact on the process. In the first place, 
the lack of enough peacekeeping troops allowed serious violations of human rights between 
the parties.172 These human rights violations and the impunity that accompanied them 
injured the confidence of the parties in the peace process. Second, several sanctions and oil 
and weapons embargoes were imposed on UNITA. The lack of action from the UN to 
enforce these sanctions allowed UNITA to maintain its normal activities against the 
government. It was not until 1998 that the UN finally targeted the exports of diamonds 
from areas under the control of UNITA and the group’s bank accounts. The delay in 
applying such measures allowed UNITA to purchase guns and fuel that were used to 
maintain its military strength during the implementation of the accords.173 According to 
Spears:  
Under siege, the government accused the United Nations Observer Mission 
of failing to monitor effectively UNITA’s disarmament and demobilization. 
For the United Nations, which had committed US$1.5 billion and 7,000 
peacekeepers to the Angolan peace process, the breakdown of the Lusaka 
Protocol was an embarrassment.174  
Despite that, the Peace Accords Matrix coded the implementation of the 
mechanisms for verification and monitoring as fully implemented.175 And despite the last 
efforts of the UN to control UNITA’s actions and finances, the mixture of the delay in 
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deploying UNAVEM’s troops, serious human rights violations, constant impunity, and the 
access to natural resources, weapons, and fuel allowed UNITA to maintain its strength, 
posing a serious threat to the process, to the point of resuming the conflict in full scale. 
5. Economic Funding 
In Angola, the allocation of resources to implement the Lusaka Protocol is not very 
specific. But still, the data available show significant economic support, especially by 
international donors, including the UN, the United States, and members of the European 
Union. Unfortunately, the economic assistance to the Lusaka Protocol suffered a 
progressive reduction in response to the increasing violation of the accords and human 
rights. The participation of the United States in the Lusaka accords was substantial; it 
provided half a billion dollars for humanitarian aid and for establishing democratic 
institutions.176 The United States also provided almost 30 percent of the UN’s operation 
costs in Angola, and over 50 percent of the relief operations costs, among other donations 
provided during the implementation of the accords.177 The involvement of the United 
States was also indirect, by providing loans and purchasing about 50 percent of Angola’s 
oil exports. This assistance not only played a direct role in economic support to Angola, it 
also served as a tool to put pressure on the parties during critical moments caused by the 
violations of the protocol.178  
The European Union also contributed to the effort of implementing peace in 
Angola. EU funds were used in the deployment of human rights monitors, mine clearance, 
and support of the demobilization of ex-combatants.179 As time went by the European 
Union realized that the situation in Angola was deteriorating. The European Union 
criticized UNITA’s poor compliance in its demilitarization, as well as detailed information 
about its military forces. In 1998, right before the complete failure of the Lusaka accords, 
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the EU invested about $100 million in urgent socio-economic projects.180 In 1998 as well, 
the British government cut its economic assistance to Angola due the failure on governance 
and human rights matters. On July 8, the same year, the European Union reported that it 
had officially put in place the UN sanctions, blocking UNITA’s bank accounts and cutting 
any transaction that involved diamonds coming from zones under the control of 
UNITA.181 These sanctions were proven to be carried out too late for the sake of the 
process. Table 2 shows the level of implementation of the five provisions and the total 
implementation of the agreement as a whole in Angola. 
Table 2. Percentage of peace accord programs implementation in Angola 
Provisions Level of Implementation 
Military (DDR) Minimum 
Political  Full 
Judicial Minimum* 
Involvement International Community Full 
Economic Funding Full 
% of implementation 54% after 5 years 
*This refers to the amnesty included in the Lusaka accords; judicial reforms were not 
included as provisions. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The case study of Angola shows how the poor implementation of the DDR 
provisions can have major consequences in the outcome of peace processes. Failure in the 
implementation of this provision created a chain of events that eventually resulted in the 
restarting of the conflict. In Angola UNITA failed in demobilizing most of its troops, 
probably with the goal of maintaining a reserve of well-trained men for further offensive 
or defensive actions. This tactic allowed its military structure to remain strong and ready 
to engage if necessary. Maintaining control over a large arsenal after handing over a small 
number of weapons in poor condition empowered UNITA to confront the government in 
moments of crisis. Probably not the lack of funds but their mismanagement resulted in the 
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poor implementation of reintegration programs, thus reducing the options for the 
combatants and making it more appealing for them to go back to fight the government than 
to fight poverty.  
UNITA’s military capacity reduced the ability of the UN to mediate and to find a 
peaceful solution to any crisis that might occur during the implementation process. Also, 
the late deployment of the UN missions, its inefficiency to denounce cases of human rights 
violations and to enforce economic sanctions against UNITA fueled the already existing 
problems of possession of weapons and violence.  
At this point, the implementation of judicial or political provisions had little effect 
on the already condemned peace process. Trust and commitment could not grow fast 
enough between the parties to save it, since the main tool for waging war remained in the 
combatants’ hands. 
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IV. WHAT COLOMBIA HAS DONE SO FAR 
This chapter analyzes the process of implementation of the peace agreements 
signed in 2016 between the government of Colombia and the FARC, focusing on the two 
years following the signing of the accords, from November 2016 until November 2018. 
Specifically, the goal of this analysis is to assess the progress to date of four peace accord 
provisions and evaluate the economic funding available for their implementation. The 
progress attained during these two years is compared with the results and conclusions 
reached after analyzing the implementation of the agreements in El Salvador and in Angola 
to develop an informed idea of the prospects for peace consolidation in Colombia after the 
signature of a peace agreement.  
The chapter first provides a concise background of the conflict in Colombia, its 
causes, the main incompatibilities between the various camps, and the actors involved in 
about half a century of armed struggle. Second, the chapter describes the structure of the 
peace agreements signed between the government of Colombia and the FARC. Third, it 
analyzes the degree of implementation and progress of the military DDR, political and 
judicial provisions, the involvement of the international community, and the funds 
available to support the implementation of the previously mentioned provisions. Finally, 
the chapter’s conclusion provides a general idea of how the peace implementation has 
impacted Colombian society and considers the prospects for enduring peace given the 
degree of implementation of the various reforms and the insights provided by the peace 
processes in El Salvador and Angola.  
A. CONFLICT BACKGROUND 
Colombia is a country defined by its violent history, which has been largely shaped 
by political conflicts that have been taken to the extremes. The roots of the armed conflict 
in Colombia can be traced back to the harsh confrontations between the two main political 
parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, which defined the period between 1948 and 
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1958 known as La violencia.182 La violencia began with the assassination of the 
presidential candidate for the Liberal party, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, in April 1948. Gaitán’s 
assassination caused a violent reaction from the Liberals who blamed their counterparts for 
the crime. The confrontations that ensued left approximately a quarter million people 
dead.183  
La violencia period ended in 1958 with the signing of the National Front (Frente 
National) agreement. This pact was an arrangement between the Liberals and 
Conservatives to take turns in the government every four years. The National Front 
certainly reduced the violence in the country but only temporarily. The exclusive power-
sharing arrangement between these two parties reduced the possibility for political 
participation for those who did not feel represented by either of them.184 In this matter 
Charles Tilly argues, “when channels of popular protest are denied, then a logical next step 
is to take up armed action.”185 This political exclusion plus the violence that peasants had 
to suffer, poor state capacity, lack of attention to marginalized regions in the country, the 
uneven distribution of land, and other social inequalities, sparked the emergence of various 
guerrilla groups. 
These groups were composed mostly of poor and displaced peasants who decided 
to seek refuge in the marginal highlands of Colombia. One of these groups established its 
camp zone in an area called Marquetalia, which was occupied by approximately 50 men 
and their families. Marquetalia was attacked by governmental forces in 1964; after this 
attack, the survivors who included Manuel Marulanda Velez (also known as “Tiro Fijo”) 
decided to reorganize and to rename their group, which by 1966 would be known as the 
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Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces. Influenced by the increasing presence of the 
communist ideology in the region, the FARC decided to continue its armed struggle against 
the government of Colombia.186  
The FARC is a guerrilla group founded on the extreme side of the Liberal party 
with self-defense roots. The FARC maintained direct contact with the Communist party of 
Colombia, which was denied its political participation between 1958 and 1970.187 During 
a ceasefire negotiated with the government in 1984, the FARC created its own political 
party called the Patriotic Union (Union Patriotica or UP). The UP was violently repressed 
by the government, being obligated to shut down and to push FARC back to armed conflict. 
Different peace processes were held between the Colombian government and the FARC, 
the first one between 1990 and 1991, then in 1998,188 and finally in 2016, the latter being 
the only one that was signed.189  
The FARC was not the only communist-oriented guerrilla group that emerged after 
that period of time. Since the early1960s, four more guerrilla groups have been present in 
Colombia’s volatile political environment.190 First, the National Liberation Army 
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional or ELN) was founded in the early 1960s as a pro-Cuban 
Marxist based guerrilla group. In contrast with the FARC, the ELN’s members were mostly 
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college or religious educated; two of its top leaders were priests.191 The ELN participated 
in the peace process in 1990 and 1991 along with the FARC, but this process failed, and 
the ELN returned to conflict as well.192  
Second, the Liberation Popular Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación or EPL) had 
its roots in the Chinese Maoist doctrine. Its original founders were part of the student 
movements of the 1960s. The EPL signed the ceasefire with the government in 1984; a 
year later and after the assassination of its head negotiator, the EPL went back to the armed 
struggle.193  
Third was the 19th of April Movement (El Movimiento 19 de abril or M-19). The 
M-19 was founded after the presidential elections in 1970 were qualified as unfair. The M-
19 was an urban nationalist, Marxist guerrilla group characterized by notorious actions—
including stealing Simon Bolivar’s sword, seizing the embassy of the Dominican Republic, 
and occupying the palace of justice (which resulted in several casualties including innocent 
civilians).194 The M-19 participated in the 1991 peace process that led to its demobilization 
allowing them to become a political party.  
Finally, the Quintin Lame was founded in 1984 by indigenous people from the 
Cauca department of Colombia, as a result of social inequalities—especially from unequal 
land tenure and issues between land owners and poor indigenous peasants. Their 
participation in the peace process, and its demobilization in 1991, allowed Quintin Lame 
to participate in the constituent assembly the same year.195 This assembly sought to make 
important changes in the national constitution—such as establishing mechanisms for 
popular participation, opening the door for political pluralism, creation of judicial 
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institutions, and recognition of minorities among others.196 Quintin Lame took advantage 
of this opportunity to include important reform in the constitution regarding indigenous 
issues.  
The creation of multiple guerrilla groups since the 1960s show different aspects of 
incompatibility with the government of the time. These incompatibilities included political 
restriction, social and land ownership inequalities, and even ethnic motivations to conduct 
armed opposition against the government. It also shows that peace is a very complex task. 
While the EPL, the M-19, and Quintin Lame accepted the government’s offerings and 
demobilized in 1991, FARC and the ELN decided to continue their armed struggle. Still 
the implementation of the agreement for those who decided to find a peaceful end to the 
conflict was fundamental. None of those groups resumed the conflict and some of their 
leaders, like the ones from the M-19, are still part of the political scene in Colombia. The 
failure to resume the conflict provides an insight into the importance of the implementation 
of peace agreements and why it is important to analyze the current peace process between 
the Colombian government and the FARC. 
The FARC ended up being the largest, most significant, and longest lasting threat. 
The armed conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government lasted more than 
50 years. Throughout this time, the FARC evolved significantly; it expanded 
organizationally, increased its military capabilities, gathered new armaments, and recruited 
many new members. At its peak, the FARC’s membership was estimated at approximately 
16,000 to 20,000 men in arms.197 Peter Waldman describes data from an official report 
collected by Jose Rios and Daniel Garcia who found that, in 1985, there was some form of 
guerrilla presence in 175 municipalities out of the 1,005 that comprised the total number 
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of municipalities in the country, approximately 17.2 percent of the total.198 By 1995, this 
presence had increased to 622 municipalities out of 1,071 that existed at the time, or 59.8 
percent.199 The FARC’s growth and organizational survival may be attributed, at least in 
part, to the insurgent group’s financing tactics—which included extortion, kidnapping, the 
imposition of revolutionary taxes, and a significant involvement in narcotics trafficking 
activities—as well as their fear-based campaigns.200 
The conflict between the government of Colombia and the FARC became one of 
the longest lasting conflicts in the world. By the end of the conflict, approximately 260,000 
people had been killed, 45,000 disappeared, 6.7 million internally displaced, and the 
population of 63 percent of the Colombian territory at risk by landmines, to mention just a 
few of the consequences.201 In November 2016, after 52 years of armed struggle and 
several failed attempts at peace negotiations, the Government of Colombia and the FARC 
finally signed a peace agreement that put an end to the armed conflict.202  
B. THE PEACE PROCESS 
In November 2012 representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC 
began a process of negotiations to put a peaceful end to a half century of armed conflict.203 
It was not until November 24, 2016, that the president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos 
Calderón, representing the government, and Timoleón Jiménez, representing the FARC, 
signed the peace agreement to end the conflict in the hopes of bringing long-lasting peace 
to Colombia’s citizens. This peace agreement is composed of a set of different documents 
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or accords—six in total—each comprising individual chapters within the final document. 
Besides ending the armed conflict, the peace agreement aimed to prioritize human rights, 
to improve socio-economic and environmental conditions, to include all of the Colombian 
citizenry in the process, and to improve the democratic process in the country.204  
The peace agreement in Colombia in its six chapters covers the following topics:205 
• Comprehensive rural reform: The agreement seeks to improve the quality 
of life in the countryside, reduce poverty, and close the economic and 
social gap between the rural and urban populations. 
• Political participation: In this chapter, the peace agreement intends to 
improve the democratic environment in Colombia by guaranteeing 
political pluralism, opposition, and debate about the main issues in the 
Colombian agenda. 
• End of the conflict, ceasefire, and cessation of hostilities: This chapter 
aims to address the armed conflict itself. It includes provisions to disarm 
and reintegrate FARC members into society. It also guarantees to avoid 
political violence and corruption by creating new police units and civilian 
organizations to fight these problems.  
• Solution to illegal drugs issues: This chapter is designed to address the 
issues related to the production and trafficking of drugs and the crime 
associated with this phenomenon. 
• Victims: Chapter Six recognizes the victims of the conflict and their 
reparations. It also creates judicial mechanisms to investigate and punish 
human rights violations in search of truth, justice, and minimum impunity.  
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• Implementation and verification mechanisms: This chapter establishes the 
roles of the local and international actors responsible for verifying, 
monitoring, promoting, and implementing the agreement. It also states the 
support in technical matters provided by the Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies. 
• Other Annexes and timeline. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS  
The period after the signing of a peace agreement is critical for the process as a 
whole. The implementation process is difficult, complex, and filled with challenges. Soon 
after the good news of the signing was spread, the process received a big hit, but this time 
it unexpectedly came from the Colombian population. In October 2016, Colombians were 
asked to approve the agreements in a public referendum. A tight majority (54 percent) of 
the population voted not to implement the agreement.206 The agreement was reformed; 
later the congress of Colombia approved its implementation. The exact reason for why a 
majority voted for not implementing the agreement may have various causes but what it 
really shows is that even in a country that suffered the lack of peace, a peaceful resolution 
can be challenged from any direction, sometimes from where it is least expected. The 
negative view of the population about the peace process also exemplifies the fact that 
signing the agreements does not automatically mean that peace is granted. Many other 
challenges are expected along the road of implementing the agreements. The importance 
of the implementation stage is sometimes underestimated, but for this research it is the 
most relevant stage, due to its complexity and because it is where the real commitment to 
peace is displayed. The peace agreement in Colombia is designed to address the main 
causes and consequences of the conflict. This section focuses on evaluating the degree of 
implementation of military (DDR), political, judicial, and international actor provisions to 
date, and to consider the funds available to support the implementation of the peace 
accords. 
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1. Military Provisions (DDR) 
Chapter Three of the Colombian peace agreement established the guidelines and 
timeline to conduct the “Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and 
the Laying down of Arms (BDCCH).”207 These guidelines define the areas where 
demobilizing combatants would concentrate. In this regard, the government of Colombia 
and the FARC agreed to create 20 Transitional Local Zones for Normalization (TLZN) and 
seven Transitional Local Points for Normalization (TLPN). The chapter also describes the 
processes of laying down arms, reintegrating former combatants into society, deploying 
Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM), and transforming the FARC into a 
political party. It also described other security details such as measures to avoid incidents 
between the army and FARC troops, respect of the air space above the TLZNs and TLPNs, 
amongst other logistics.208 
The demobilization of FARC’s combatants was conducted without major 
complications. The demobilization process included a total of 15 subtopics, all of which 
were fully implemented during the two-year period after the signing of the accords. TLZNs 
and TLPNs were also implemented as planned to accommodate all the demobilized people 
with the necessary conditions of comfort and dignity.209 According to the Kroc Institute 
for International Peace Studies, “These zones received a total of 9.190 ex-combatants.”210 
Thus, demobilization provisions were completed at 100 percent.  
Disarmament provisions have also been implemented successfully. According to 
the Kroc Institute, “the [disarmament] process in Colombia was more complete and faster 
than in the majority of peace accords, this shows FARC’s high level of commitment with 
the peace process.”211 In addition, the ratio of weapons delivered per combatant was very 
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high. The UN has collected a total of 8,994 weapons from 9,190 former combatants. The 
UN has also retrieved and destroyed the weapons and explosives from over 700 caches. By 
November 2018, six out of the eight dispositions had been implemented. This represents 
75 percent of the disarmament program.212 Fifty-two out of the 1,100 caches reported by 
the FARC, however, still need to be located and destroyed. These, along with the two 
monuments that will be constructed using the destroyed weapons, represent the 25 percent 
that remains to be implemented.213  
The reintegration provisions of the accord have been partially implemented to date. 
According to the Kroc institute, “the program of reintegration is comprised by 23 
dispositions. By November 2018, 10 [ten] out of those have been fully implemented, 8 
[eight] are in an intermediate level of implementation, 2 [two] are in the minimum level 
and 3 [three] have not started to be implemented.”214  
The biggest deficiencies in the process of implementation of reintegration 
provisions can be observed in the commitment to deliver monthly payments to former 
combatants, the approval of development projects, the creation of a comprehensive health 
system, and the education system for the newly demobilized. By November 2018, 
approximately 43 percent of the socio-economic reintegration program for FARC members 
had been implemented. 
This reintegration program also includes provisions for integrating FARC members 
into political life. It includes a total of 13 dispositions of which five are in the process of 
implementation and eight have been fully implemented. This means that 62 percent of the 
political integration dispositions have been implemented fully. By November 2018, the 
FARC was officially considered a political party and ten of its members occupied seats in 
government, with five in the senate and five in the chamber of representatives.215 The 
reintegration program also includes other dispositions such as the reintegration of underage 
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personnel and the control of land mines. By November 2018, these two provisions had 
been implemented at the rate of 67 and 50 percent, respectively.216 The monitoring and 
verification mechanism to oversee the implementation of these provisions was also fully 
implemented, showing the commitment of the international community with this process.  
In sum, during the two-year period after the signing of the peace accords, 
implementation of the DDR military provisions has been quite successful. One hundred 
percent of the demobilization program has been implemented completely; 75 percent of 
the disarmament program has been implemented thus far and is progressing well. As for 
reintegration provisions, 43 percent of the socio-economic program, 67 percent of the 
underage personnel reintegration program, 62 percent of the political incorporation 
program, 50 percent of the land mines control program, and 100 percent of the monitoring 
verification mechanisms have been implemented thus far.217 The significant progress 
made since the signing of the peace accords and the near completion of key military 
provisions suggest the success of this component of the peace accords.  
2. Political Provisions 
As mentioned before, Chapter Three, titled “End of the Conflict,” addresses the 
creation of FARC’s political party. It is part of the reintegration program in the military 
provisions. Chapter Two of the Colombia peace agreement “Political Participation: A 
Democratic Opportunity to Build Peace” comprises a series of provisions to guarantee the 
participation in politics of previous and newly formed political parties. Chapter Two 
includes provisions about access to media, security measures to protect political 
representatives of the opposition, human rights, and social movements, guarantees for 
mobilization, peaceful protest, non-stigmatization political pluralism, and transparency, 
among others.218 By November 2018, the participation provisions have experienced the 
most significant delays. Only 17 percent are at an intermediate or total level of 
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implementation. Thirty-four percent of the provisions are at a minimum level of 
implementation, while 49 percent have not started to be implemented.219  
The most significant achievements within the political participation provisions 
include the approval of the opposition statute that provides certain guarantees for political 
participation, not only for FARC’s political party but for others who identify themselves 
in opposition to the actual government. In contrast, the disposition about security to prevent 
political violence shows little improvement. Only one out of its ten sub-topics has been 
fully implemented. According to the Kroc Institute, “the little advance in this sub-topic 
constitutes the main alert in the implementation of the accord.”220 In this matter and 
according to the Kroc Institute, in 2018, 178 social leaders and human rights defenders 
were assassinated. This was an increase of 27 percent compared to 2017, when there were 
126 cases.221 Former combatants and their families have been victims as well. According 
to a report by the UN, “85 assassinations of former combatants and their families were 
committed within the two years after signing the agreement.”222 It is necessary to improve 
the implementation of political provisions in the Colombian peace process, especially in 
terms of security for social leaders and human rights defenders. The fact that the FARC is 
officially a political party, ten seats in congress have been granted, and that guarantees for 
the political opposition exist cannot diminish the harm that violence can cause to the 
process.  
3. Judicial Provisions 
Chapter Five of the peace agreement, titled “Victims,” describes comprehensive 
measures and procedures to compensate the victims of the conflict. This chapter also 
includes details about justice, human rights, and truth and reconciliation, among others; all 
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of these components seek to build a comprehensive judicial system.223 The biggest 
achievements within the judicial provisions include the presentation of the truth 
commission and the Special Unit for the Search for Persons deemed as Missing in the 
context of and due to the armed conflict. Good progress has also been made in the 
establishment of seven main cases to be investigated by the peace special justice.224 On 
the other hand, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of these provisions seem 
to outnumbered by the actual achievements. In this regard, the judicial provisions have 
been dealing with serious delays in the establishment of the legal advisory system for the 
victims, budget reductions for the implementation of different programs including the 
reparation of victims and the truth commission, among others.225 The Kroc Institute 
expresses that, according to the general experience, implementing the dispositions relating 
to the truth and reconciliation commission takes more time than the timeline established in 
the agreement. Thirty-five percent of the agreements coded in the Peace Accords Matrix 
include these dispositions; 75 percent of these agreements did not start the implementation 
or did not achieve minimum levels of implementation within two years after signing the 
agreement. Only the peace agreement in El Salvador reached the maximum level of 
implementation within two years.226  
Another sensitive topic is the peace special justice. This independent mechanism 
allows the judgment and punishment of those who participated in the conflict. The 
implementation of this mechanism includes a total of 38 dispositions; five have been fully 
implemented, six are at an intermediate level of implementation, and ten are at a minimum 
level while 17 have not started to be implemented.227 Modifying the judicial provisions is 
one of the topics that have created most disagreements between the government and the 
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FARC, especially since the new President of Colombia, Ivan Duque, took office in August 
2018. Duque’s refusal to sign the peace special justice’s legal framework can destabilize 
the process with negative consequences; in addition the process to approve this legal 
framework is quite long, and it could leave the peace special justice without legal support 
for those who already confessed their participation in human rights violations and other 
crimes related to the conflict.228 The legal uncertainty can push the former combatants to 
return to conflict. The president’s decision not to sign the law generated different reactions 
within the parties involved in the process and the public in general.229 
Chapter Five of the Colombian peace agreement has a total of 90 dispositions. By 
November 2018, 11 percent of the dispositions had been fully implemented, 9 percent are 
in an intermediate level of implementation, 38 percent are in a minimum level of 
implementation, and the remaining 42 percent are still pending to start the process of 
implementation. The results after two years since the signing of the agreement are not very 
positive. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the implementation of such provisions tends 
to span a longer period; the allocation of funds, institutional changes, and a sustained effort 
are necessary to improve implementation and achieve the goals of the Colombian peace 
agreement. 
4. The Involvement of the International Community 
Chapter Six of the peace agreement, titled “Implementation, verification and public 
Endorsement” deals with the creation of the mechanisms necessary to conduct a proper 
oversight of the agreement. One of the mechanisms is the Commission for Monitoring, 
Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CMPVI). This 
commission is composed of three representatives of the Colombian government and three 
former combatants representing the FARC. Its international component should consist of 
one representative of each guarantor country, and one of each observer country would be 
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designated to accompany this commission during the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and 
the disarming process.230 This chapter also establishes the participation of the United 
Nations, and its role of verifying the implementation of the agreement and the roles of the 
international accompaniment component.231 The parties also agreed to request the 
participation of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, whose mission is to 
provide technical support to record and to analyze the progress of the implementation of 
the agreement.232 
The international participation in this agreement can be considered as successful. 
The international verification component is comprised by six dispositions that have all been 
fully implemented.233 The international accompaniment component includes 12 
dispositions that have been fully implemented as well.234 The UN political mission in 
Colombia has also complied with its designated tasks, and its mandate has been renewed 
until September 2019.235 The international actors have accomplished their main tasks, 
either by directly participating in the processes, like disarming, reincorporation, political 
participation, among others, or indirectly by providing periodic reports about the progress 
of the implementation. Either way, the involvement of the international security element 
maintains a stable environment in which the actors can build up strong basis for the 
implementation of the peace agreement. 
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5. Economic Funding 
Different sources have calculated that implementing peace in Colombia would cost 
approximately $45 billion over a period of 10 to 20 years.236 It is certainly not a cheap 
process due to the complexity of the social, political, and judicial reforms that the 
agreement aims to achieve. In this matter the international community has provided a 
substantial amount of money to support these reforms. The international donors include the 
UN fund for post-conflict, which has donated over $85 million, the World Bank, which has 
donated approximately $7.1 million, the European Union with €96.4 million 
(approximately $106 million), and the Inter-American Development Bank with an 
estimated $211 million, for a total $409 million.237 The U.S. government under then-
president Barack Obama also promised a sum close to $450 million.238 For the fiscal year 
2019, $418.1 million were appropriated by the U.S. Congress to be used in support of 
different programs including the implementation of peace.239 The amount of money 
provided by international donors is no small sum, but it is likely to be insufficient to address 
all the programs in the peace agreement. Most of the funds would have to come from local 
sources. The Colombian government is planning to appropriate about $34 billion for a 
period of 15 to 20 years in order to comply with the agreements.240  
Chapter Six of the peace agreement in Colombia included one topic that establishes 
measurements for planning and financing the implementation of the accords. This topic 
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comprises four dispositions, mainly legislative measures that are supposed to guarantee 
that the government include in its planning specific resources for implementing the peace 
in the long term. By November 2018 one of them had been fully implemented, two were 
in the process of implementation, and one has not yet started to be implemented.241 Thus 
far, there is a lack of clarity about long-term planning, which means that the allocation of 
funds for the implementation of peace will have to be done annually. The problem with 
this type of planning is that the money for implementing peace will not be secure in its 
totality. Different governments with different policies will come and go, jeopardizing the 
investment in peace. So far, the judicial242 and other programs dealing with social 
reintegration have been affected by the lack or prioritization of funds.  
It is uncertain whether the funds will be completely sufficient for the 
implementation process. What is certain is that the commitment from the government is 
necessary to improve the legislation that allows local funds to be used in the programs 
described in the agreement. Failing to allocate the necessary funds for social, political, or 
judicial programs can seriously threaten the outcome of the peace process. Table 3 shows 
the general level of implementation per chapter of the peace agreement, and the total 
implementation of the agreement as a whole in Colombia until 2018.  
Table 3. General implementation of the peace agreement in Colombia, 
November 2018243 







Chapter One 38% 51% 9% 2% 
Chapter Two 49% 34% 4% 13% 
Chapter Three  20% 18% 18% 44% 
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Chapter Four  36% 45% 17% 12% 
Chapter Five  42% 38% 9% 11% 
Chapter Six  12% 23% 11% 54% 
Economic 
Funding 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Total agreement 33% 32% 12% 23% 
 
D. CONCLUSION  
By November 2018, only two years after signing the peace agreement in Colombia, 
it is difficult to predict its outcome. In general terms, 68 percent of the agreements are in a 
certain stage of implementation. Twenty-three percent are fully implemented, while 12 
percent are expected to be fully implemented according to schedule.244 Thirty-three 
percent of the agreements have been barely implemented, and it is difficult to assess 
whether they will meet the schedule. The remaining 32 percent have not started the process 
of implementation.245 This delay can be explained, in part, by important delays in 
legislative reforms or because they depend on the implementation of other commitments 
or because some provisions are designed to be implemented in the short term while others 
require more time to show important progress. This being said, the information provided 
in this chapter of the thesis shows mixed results with a tendency to the positive side. 
Positive achievements in certain areas of the agreement, especially demobilization and 
disarming, participation of the FARC in politics, and the involvement of the international 
community in the process lay strong foundations for the further implementation of other 
programs. Deficiencies in the judicial provisions and lack of funds to implement social 
programs can bring negative consequences to general outcomes of the process if they are 
not addressed properly and promptly. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The process of peace deal implementation is fraught with challenging obstacles. 
More often than not, peace accords are carried out in contexts of significant distrust and 
resentment among parties, uncertainty about the promised outcomes, and under the 
constant inquiry from a demanding population. As such, the implementation of accords 
itself can severely undermine the possibility of a successful conflict resolution. And, it 
often has. According to the UCDP data set, 40 percent of signed peace accords between 
1975 and 2011 failed to meet their goals and resulted in a return to conflict.246 Yet, we 
have thus far lacked a clear sense of where the biggest pitfalls are in the implementation 
process.  
This thesis zeroed in on the experience that followed the signing of peace accords. 
It sought to understand what the central challenges are in the peace accord implementation 
process and which provisions play a critical role enabling the consolidation of peace. In 
particular, the thesis investigated the peace accord implementation stage through an 
analysis of peace processes in El Salvador, Angola, and Colombia. These three cases 
provide clear insights into how the implementation of specific provisions shapes the 
outcomes of peace processes. Whereas the case of El Salvador represents an instance of a 
successful peace accord implementation, the case of Angola evidences how the poor 
implementation of key provisions in the peace accords led to the resumption of conflict. 
The case of Colombia provides the opportunity to analyze an ongoing peace process during 
its implementation phase and evaluate the progress achieved to date.  
To analyze the peace accord implementation process, this thesis has focused on five 
key types of accord provisions: military, judicial, political, international involvement, and 
economic funding. The military provisions address the armed conflict in its very basic 
nature and include the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants. 
Judicial provisions seek to reduce impunity after the conflict-related crimes and focus on 
amnesties, victim reparations, and reforms to the judicial institutional apparatus. Political 
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provisions are designed to address the challenges of creating institutional channels for the 
different parties involved in the conflict. They involve the creation and legalization of 
political parties, guarantees for the political participation of demobilized actors, and the 
implementation of free and fair elections, among others. Provisions related to the 
involvement of the international community in the peace process aim to reduce the 
environment of uncertainty and mistrust previously mentioned. They assign supervisory 
roles to the international community in order to facilitate the adoption of the various 
provisions by skeptical parties. Finally, economic provisions establish the costs as well as 
where the resources to support the peace process will come from.  
While these provisions do not encompass the entirety of the peace accords, they 
nonetheless capture arguably the most important and difficult challenges of the peace 
process. Importantly, these various provisions were all present in the three peace processes 
studied in this thesis, which suggests that something about the implementation experience 
itself, rather than the content of the accords ultimately played a critical role in shaping the 
outcome. Further, because all three accords were signed by the various parties involved, 
we can assume a certain degree of satisfaction with the provisions in the agreement; 
otherwise, the various parties would have not signed the agreement in the first place. By 
evaluating whether and how the various provisions were implemented and what the 
implications of this were for guaranteeing long-term peace, this thesis sheds light on the 
challenges of peace implementation and the particular provisions that, if implemented 
poorly, can undermine the peace process.  
The analyses implemented in this thesis reveal three central findings: (1) not all 
provisions are made alike, (2) timing is everything, and (3) provisions are interdependent 
such that failure in the implementation of one can have significant repercussions in the 
implementation of the others. These findings represent the factors that explain the variation 
in the success of peace processes after the signing of a peace agreement: 
A. CORE VERSUS SUPPORTIVE PROVISIONS  
Given the ultimate goal of achieving long-lasting peace, it is imperative that we 
differentiate between core and supportive provisions. Core provisions are those that are 
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essential for the consolidation of peace, provisions that, if left unimplemented, will almost 
certainly lead to the collapse of the peace process. Supportive provisions, on the other hand, 
reinforce the peace process by facilitating integration, reducing uncertainty, reinforcing the 
commitments, and legitimizing the peace process. On their own, supportive provisions 
cannot sustain peace.  
The study of peace accord implementation processes in El Salvador and Angola 
suggests three core provisions—DDR, international community involvement, and 
economic funding—and two supportive provisions—political and judicial. A comparison 
of these implementation experiences allows us to assess progress towards long-lasting 
peace in the Colombian case. 
1. Core Provisions 
DDR provisions, international community involvement provisions, and economic 
funding provisions stand out as three sets of provisions that are essential for the successful 
resolution of conflict. DDR provisions drastically decrease the threat of conflict by 
dissolving the military structures of the various parties, removing the weapons from their 
hands, and providing feasible exit options for former combatants. DDR provisions were 
implemented promptly and successfully in the case of El Salvador. The demobilization 
program concluded in December 1992, roughly 11 months after the signature of the peace 
agreement. The process ended with the demobilization of over 12,000 men, including fully 
capable and injured FMLN combatants.247 The successful implementation of this 
particular provision resulted in the official declaration by ONUSAL that the armed conflict 
between the FMLN and the government had reached its end by the December 1992. In 
August 1993, the FMLN stated that its military organization was definitively dissolved, 
right after the conclusion of a successful process of disarmament.248 In contrast, the 
implementation of DDR programs in Angola suffered significant delays. Although the 
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ceasefire was active, most combatants did not demobilize and weapons were not 
decommissioned effectively.249 Ultimately, this enabled the return to conflict.  
Provisions focused on the role of the international community are also critical for a 
successful peace accord implementation.250 The involvement of the UN in El Salvador 
started early in the process and was coded as fully implemented soon after the signing of 
the agreement.251 The UN’s participation in mediating during stalled moments was also 
substantial, especially during the demobilization and disarming process. In contrast, in 
Angola the participation of the UN was not as positive as in El Salvador. Despite the fact 
that the Lusaka accord included specific roles for the UN mission in Angola and that the 
UN was present in the country even before the signing of the Bicesse accord,252 its 
participation left many doubts about its efficiency. A late deployment of its military 
component allowed human rights violations to be committed. Poor demobilization and 
disarming programs were carried out. The UN also failed in enforcing economic sanctions 
and embargos that allowed UNITA to buy weapons and to strengthen its military capacity, 
which resulted in the resumption of the conflict.253 The weakness of the international 
community generated uncertainties that limited the various parties’ incentives to comply.  
Finally, the economic provisions proved critical for the success of a peace process 
as they condition the capacity for implementation of accords and their management. Peace 
processes are very expensive to implement. Buying large amounts of land, providing health 
services, education, credits, tools, salaries, implementing institutional changes, creating 
new institutions, funding political parties and their publicity, are some of the expenses 
required to achieve peace. The allocation of funds in El Salvador was substantial, and even 
after certain shortages, the majority of provisions and programs were properly funded and 
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therefore well implemented.254 In Angola the allocation of funds was not a problem for 
the implementation phase, but international donors seemed reluctant to provide more 
support due to a series of human rights violations and armed actions, eventually many 
donors stopped their economic aid and this dealt a final blow to the peace accords.255  
2. Supportive Provisions 
Supportive provisions were implemented to various degrees in El Salvador and 
Angola. Political provisions aimed to shift the conflict to the institutional arena by 
legalizing political parties and allowing electoral participation by the various parties in the 
conflict. While in El Salvador the FMLN was granted participation in politics and 
presidential elections were held according to the agreement,256 in Angola little was made 
to comply with political inclusion of UNITA and even less to hold elections. This was 
probably because of the poor progress made in the DDR programs by UNITA. When 
UNITA was finally recognized as a political party, the peace process was already going 
through a critical moment.257 Soon after that, the conflict restarted.    
Judicial provisions, for their part, sought to guarantee the legal status of former 
combatants after the conflict ended. In El Salvador the agreement aimed to reform the 
judicial system in order to make it independent from other branches of the state. This 
independence will allow the investigation of human rights violations in order to avoid 
impunity.258 In March 1993, a presidential amnesty was granted to all the combatants 
involved in the conflict; the amnesty was not well received by the population and especially 
by the victims.259 Despite the fact that the judicial provisions did not reach the full level 
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of implementation, the progress made served its purpose by reducing the uncertainty about 
the future for those involved in the conflict. By contrast, this provision did not serve any 
purpose in Angola. No amnesty or judicial reform was implemented before the conflict 
reached its full scale again.260 
3. Implications for Colombia’s Implementation Process 
The comparison of the El Salvador and Angola experiences enables an assessment 
of Colombia’s peace accord implementation experience to date. The analyses suggest that 
Colombia has made significant progress towards guaranteeing long-lasting peace after the 
signing of the accords. The core provisions in the Colombian peace agreement have been 
implemented in their majority and relatively soon after the signing of the agreement. This 
shows the recognition of these provisions as a fundamental part of the process. 
The demobilization and disarmament programs were implemented without major 
challenges, and soon after the signing of the agreement.261 In general dissolving the 
military structure of the FARC and ending the armed conflict has been successful. The 
reintegration program is still in the process of implementation mostly due to funding issues.  
The international community involved in the Colombian peace agreement received 
detailed tasks about their role in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the 
agreement.262 The UN took part during the implementation of core and supportive 
provisions as well, facilitating a stable environment and the completion of many programs 
throughout the process. The economic funding in Colombia has been sufficient for the 
implementation of the peace agreement so far. Funds from international and local sources 
have been promised and some have already been provided.263 Most of the money will 
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come from internal sources. Time and reforms in legislation that secures the funds for the 
implementation of the agreement will determine the outcome of the process. 
In the political realm, the environment of the process improved substantially when 
the FARC was officially recognized as a political party and the seats in congress were 
occupied by former FARC combatants as stated in the agreement.264 Delays in other sub-
topics of the political section have not threatened the peace process. The participation in 
politics of the former combatants has been an important motivation for them to relinquish 
their weapons. Political participation will not be allowed unless the disarming happens first 
or at least is in progress. Two years after the signing of the agreement, there is still plenty 
of time in the intermediate and long term to improve in this field.  
Judicial provisions play an important role in reinforcing the perception of impunity 
in people’s minds, and in reducing the uncertainty about the legal future of the former 
combatants. An amnesty will bring the best results for the process because it releases all 
the parties from responsibility, reassuring their legal transition and inclusion into society 
without fear of severe punishment; unfortunately, amnesties may hurt the victims of the 
conflict directly. Also, changes in the judicial agreements can cause serious inconvenience 
for the parties during the implementation process, jeopardizing their trust in one another. 
The implementation of judicial provisions in Colombia has created disagreements between 
the parties since the arrival of Ivan Duque as the president of Colombia in 2018. His will 
to make changes in the judicial section of the agreement was not welcomed by the 
FARC.265 As well as the political provisions, the judicial issues can and must be solved. 
Time and probably the involvement of a mediator third party will help to achieve a 
negotiated solution to these issues.  
The comparison of the El Salvador, Angola, and Colombia peace processes 
indicates that the prioritization and proper implementation of specific provisions is 
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fundamental for explaining variations in the success of peace processes after the signing of 
a peace agreement. 
4. Timing of Reform Implementation 
The immediate stage after the signing of the agreement is critical for the process. 
Real manifestations of commitment to the implementation should be seen during this short 
period of time. Strong bases have to be laid in the short term. As seen in the El Salvador 
and Colombia cases, the demobilization and disarmament programs started and concluded 
as soon as possible, followed by establishment of reincorporation activities. The official 
troops normally allow this movement by returning to their bases, in order to avoid 
accidental encounters that can endanger the process. In the short term a lot has to happen 
due to the uncertainty that reigns in that context. The first moves by the former combatants 
have to be clear and occur promptly. Delays and hesitations will almost inevitably 
undermine the process by generating distrust in a fragile context. 
5. Interdependence between Provisions 
Besides highlighting the importance of core provisions, the analyses also show a 
relationship of interdependence between core accord provisions. Without an impartial third 
party committed to the process, it is likely naïve to expect that deadly enemies can 
overcome moments of crisis even after choosing peaceful means. A deteriorating peace 
agreement will reduce the will of external and local donors to invest their funds in the 
implementation of the peace agreement. A shortage in funds will have serious 
consequences in the implementation of core and supportive provisions. The lack of trust, 
the absence of a mediator, and funds to implement comprehensive judicial guarantees or 
political participation will reduce the chances for combatants to hand over their weapons. 
As long as parties have access to weapons, the chances to restart the confrontation are very 
high, and the peace process from that point is more likely to fail.  
The vicious cycle associated with these three provisions can start differently but 
will end in the same way. Insufficiency of funds at any moment after the signing of the 
agreement will lead to poor implementation of some, or of most of the provisions, including 
DDR, and the deployment of peacekeeping monitoring and verification missions. Poor 
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implementation will fail to guarantee a promising future for the former combatants, who 
probably will not hand over their weapons. The failure to disarm parties increases the 
chances for accidental or intentional armed confrontation significantly. Also holding 
weapons will reduce the ability for peaceful remediation during stalled progress. In 
contrast, when the parties have been previously disarmed, the parties will feel obligated to 
seek a negotiated solution at any critical moment.  
To avoid the negative effects of the interdependence of the core provisions, 
successful peace processes normally implement the DDR provisions in the short term after 
the signing of the agreement. The funds for their implementation are available from day 
one, and the international component in the process is present from the negotiations stage 
or in some cases even before. The inclusion of these factors early in the process of 
implementation also plays two roles: 1) it confirms the importance of these factors, and 
that special attention to them is required, and 2) their prioritization is necessary for laying 
down a strong basis for the implementation of other important but less critical provisions. 
Political and judicial provisions exemplify this position.  
6. Recommendations for Conflict Resolution-related Policies 
Several recommendations for conflict resolution policies arise from this 
investigation. The first is that timing and priorities matter. The study suggests that peace 
processes should not be started without guarantees of (1) a well-established and effective 
international component with detailed tasks regarding intermediation, verification, and 
monitoring, and (2) properly planned economic resources that guarantee the 
implementation of short- and long-term provisions. Once implementation starts, 
disarmament and demobilization provisions must be implemented immediately after the 
signing of accords and completed promptly thereafter. To the extent that international 
support and economic resources are scarce, the focus of all supportive actors and resources 
should center on successfully implementing DDR provisions. The mutually reinforcing 
behavior of these three core provisions—international support, economic resources, and 
DDR—will set the peace process on track to achieving its ultimate goal. 
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Supportive provisions should be well designed in the function of strengthening the 
efforts of the core provisions. These provisions can be part of a chronological plan of 
implementation that allows flexibility and a negotiation margin during stalled moments in 
the process. 
Special attention should also be given to reintegration programs. As the case of El 
Salvador shows, there are inherent risks in the poor implementation of reintegration 
programs. In El Salvador, despite the fact that the lack of funds and low prioritization in 
reintegrating former combatants did not have direct repercussions in the peace process, it 
nonetheless opened the socio-economic gap and failed to reincorporate demobilized 
combatants into society. Ultimately, many former combatants returned to violence and 
joined criminal organizations. Thus, while the civil conflict ended, social violence 
continued.  
7. Policy Recommendations for Colombia 
Despite the progress made to date in implementing the peace agreements in 
Colombia, many things need to be improved in order to maintain the positive pace through 
the end of the process. The policy recommendations for Colombia include the following: 
A detailed analysis of the progress, achievements, and limitations of the agreements 
should be conducted periodically. This analysis aims to adjust the road map of the 
implementation if necessary. It is not re-negotiating the agreement, but improving the 
process itself.  
Although the government intends to make changes in the judicial provisions, this 
thesis recommends that the government maintain the original framework to avoid changes 
that modify sensitive topics like the legal future of former combatants. These types of 
modifications may cause the desertion levels to increase and reduce confidence in the peace 
process.  
It is necessary to establish legislation that guarantees the inclusion in the national 
budget of the funds required to complete the implementation of the agreement. This should 
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be planned in the long term looking to avoid any changes caused by the normal rotation of 
governmental officers. Long-term planning can guarantee long-lasting peace.  
8. Shortcomings 
This thesis presented case studies of three different peace processes. One 
represented a case in which the implementation succeeded, one in which the 
implementation failed, and one in which the implementation is still in progress. Yet, peace 
processes are remarkably complicated and diverse. Reducing the study of peace processes 
to a certain number of provisions and their overall degree of implementation, while helpful 
for understanding trends of implementation, can nonetheless obscure the complex 
processes that take place on the ground and the mechanisms that are enabling or hindering 
progress toward peace. The findings of this thesis are suggestive of trends that are 
consistent with intuition but that nonetheless must be confirmed with more in-depth work 
and additional case studies.  
Another limitation is the lack of specific information about the funding of the 
agreements. It is difficult to give an accurate assessment of the way in which the money 
has been invested. There is no data available about detailed expenditures discriminating 
between provisions. The analysis of the economic funding in this thesis was conducted on 
global amounts available for the process in general terms. 
The limited information about funding expenditure leads me to suggest future 
investigation and analysis not only on the budget available for the implementation of peace 
agreements, but also about the inclusion of economic provisions in every peace agreement 
in their influence on its outcome. A well detailed plan of expenditure will be beneficial 
during the implementation of the agreement. And, a well conducted analysis of the post-
conflict economy of the country will help to avoid social issues like the ones in post-
conflict El Salvador.  
Attempts to achieve the peaceful resolution of armed conflicts around the world are 
more common these days. The signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily mean 
that long-lasting peace is granted, but it means that what is included in that document 
should be enough to persuade the parties to stop the violence against each other. That is 
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why it is necessary to continue studying the factors that influence the outcome of these 
peace processes. By focusing on this topic, this thesis has aimed to start a necessary 
conversation about the challenges of peace accord implementation even after the arduous 
process of getting the parties to the table and convincing them to commit to peace on paper. 
Several important decisions are made during the implementation stage, like abandoning 
areas of influence either by the military or the insurgents, handing over weapons and 
allowing the opposition to officially participate in politics. Improving the process of 
implementation, especially of the core provisions, as well as supportive ones, will 
guarantee long-lasting peace. 
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